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Autonomous Cars and Tort Liability 
Lastly, the insurance framework furthers car manufacturers' chief 
concern-increasing profit margins-by placing a ceiling on damages 
and providing car manufacturers with insurance that will arguably 
provide the manufacturers with full coverage. Thus, like many other 
industries, products and strict liability still apply to autonomous cars, 
as the manufacturers should compensate those their products harm. 
Yet, due to the social utility of autonomous cars, manufacturers also 
deserve a special insurance framework to reduce risk. 
V. CONCLUSION 
With the passing of time, cars are becoming more autonomous 
and independent of humans.305 Cars can park themselves with 
minimal human intervention,306 prevent accidents, and drive 
themselves on marked roads with almost no human involvement.307 
Still, with this shift in control from humans to technology, there also 
comes a shift in liability.308 While autonomous cars will eliminate 
many accidents currently caused by human error, many other 
accidents will undoubtedly arise due to technological malfunctions. 309 
Consequently, in order to ensure that autonomous car technology 
enters the marketplace in a timely fashion, the liability of autonomous 
car and technology manufacturers requires mitigation. 
The autonomous car industry should adopt a two-tiered insurance 
framework, similar to that of the nuclear power industry that would 
also establish a ceiling on damages.310 A similar two-tiered insurance 
framework is necessary to provide certainty to manufacturers of 
autonomous cars and technology regarding their liability so they have 
an incentive to develop and produce autonomous cars. Hence, if the 
current liability framework is not altered in some way, autonomous 
cars will take much longer to enter the market and society will be 
unable to fully reap the benefits of autonomous cars until a much 
later time. With the current state of transportation and the burden it 
has on society,311 it is desirable that autonomous cars enter the 
marketplace as soon as possible. 
305. Vanderbilt, supra note 286 (displaying an interactive timeline of car's 
"Automatic Transition."). 
306. Murray, supra note 33. 
307. Hachman, supra note 43. 
308. KALRAET AL., supra note 217. 
309. Koebler, supra note 226. 
310. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (2006). 
311. See Life in the Slow Lane, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 28, 2011) available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/18620944 ("Americans are gloomy 
about their economy's ability to produce. Are they right to be? We look 
at two areas of concern, transport infrastructure and innovation."). 
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DRONE STRIKES ON CITIZENS: 
ENSURING DUE PROCESS FOR U.S. 
CITIZENS SUSPECTED OF TERRORISM 
ABROAD 
By: Casey Fitzpatrick* 
It is during our most challenging and uncertain moments that 
our Nation's commitment to due process is most severely tested; 
and it is in those times that we must preserve our commitment 
at home to the principles for which we fight abroad. 
Justice O'Connor, llamdi v. Rumsfeld1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The horrific events of September 11, 2001 and the ensuing War on 
Terror have ushered in an era rife with legal dilemmas, but few 
definitive answers. One of the areas the United States has struggled 
with is how to treat U.S. citizens who engage in terrorism. In an 
attempt to limit risk to military personnel, the United States has 
employed an unprecedented tool on the battlefield: unmanned aerial 
vehicles, commonly known as drones.2 The Obama Administration has 
significantly increased the use of drone strikes from the George W. 
Bush Administration;3 in 2010, a total of 117 drone strikes were 
conducted in Pakistan, which is double the number of strikes 
conducted in Pakistan during the entirety of G.W. Bush's presidency.4 
* B.B.A., Ohio University, M.A. Marshall University, J.D. Candidate 
2013, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. 
1. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 532 (2004). 
2. For reference to U.S. drones, see Unmanned Aerial Warfare: Flight of 
the Drones: Why the Future of Air Power Belongs to Unmanned 
Systems, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 8, 2011 (hereinafter Flight of the 
Drones]; for insight into U.S. Air Force assessment about the current 
status and future of drones, see U.S. Air Force Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems Flight Plan 2009-2041 (May 18, 2009) [hereinafter Flight Plan], 
available at http://www.govexec.com/pdfs/072309kpl.pdf. 
3. Harvey Alexander, Obama Administration Increase of Drone Strikes -
Al-Qaida Suspects Targeted in Continued War on Terror, SOLDIER FIN., 
Oct. 3, 2011 ("Drone strikes have grown significantly under the Obama 
Administration as opposed to in the Bush Administration."). 
4. See Richard D. Rosen, Drones and the U.S. Courts, 37 WM. MITCHELL 
L. REV. 5280, 5280 (2011); see also Bill Roggio & Alexander Mayer, 
Charting the Data for U.S. Airstrikes in Pakistan, 2004-2012, LONG 
WAR J., http://www.longwarjournal.org/pakistan-strikes.php (last 
updated Mar. 10, 2012). 
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. Drones have offered a military solution to eliminate suspected 
terrorists, but have also raised numerous legal issues. 
There has been considerable discourse on the legality of drone 
strikes. Many of those opinions assume, as per the common scenario, 
that the target is not a U.S. citizen. The legal complexity of drone 
strikes greatly increases when the United States subjects one of its 
own citizens to a drone strike. As is evident, monumental 
constitutional questions surrounding the limitations of a citizen's due 
process rights are raised in such circumstances. 
Part I of this Note offers an introduction to drones and details the 
legal dilemma involved in determining what procedural due process 
rights citizens retain when engaged in terrorist activities abroad. 
Included is an account of the genesis of this debate, the drone strike 
on Anwar Al-Aulaqi (Al-Aulaqi).5 Part II provides a discussion of 
due process requirements, including the foundations of procedural due 
process, an analogy to recent Supreme Court opinions regarding due 
process owed to detainees in the War on Terror, and the applicability 
of the Authorization of the Use of Military Force (AUMF) to the 
subject. Part III proposes a novel judicial proceeding, similar to a 
warrant, which requires judicial approval before the Executive can 
conduct a drone strike on a citizen. Part IV retroactively applies the 
proposed judicial hearing to the drone strike on Al-Aulaqi. Part V 
responds to likely counterarguments, while Part VI concludes the 
Note. 
A. Drones 
The use of U.S. military drones has grown exponentially. From 
2005 to 2011, there was a 1,200 percent increase in U.S. air combat 
patrols by drones, and the United States now conducts more flight 
hours in drones than manned strike aircraft.6 U.S. drones come in a 
dizzying array of varieties and capabilities, ranging from the Global 
Hawk, with a 116 foot wingspan and capability to take-off with a 
3,000 pound payload, to the Wasp III, a hand-launched 
reconnaissance vehicle with a maximum takeoff weight of 20 pounds.7 
The future is likely to see an even broader collection, including nano-
drones, which are insect-sized vehicles capable of navigation inside 
5. There are multiple spellings of Al-Aulaqi, commonly 'Al-Awlaki.' The 
form 'Al-Aulaqi' is implemented in deference to the case Al-Aulaqi v. 
Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010). 
6. Flight of the Drones, supra note 2. 
7. Flight Plan, supra note 2, at 25. 
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buildings8 and "large-sized" drones with functions like air refueling 
platforms.9 
Drones offer numerous military advantages. Most importantly, 
drones operate without an on-board pilot, eliminating the risk to 
human life and allowing for dangerous missions into contested 
airspace.10 Drones are also cheaper, in part because of the reduction 
in size and number of systems that were necessary for on-board 
pilots, 11 and reduced training costs due the ability of simulators to 
provide all necessary training. 12 Furthermore, drones are typically 
more effective than most manned aircraft, offering more accurate 
strikes, stealthier capabilities, and the ability for extended airborne 
loiter. 13 Drones also offer increased autonomy, especially because 
take-offs and landings are nearly independent of human assistance.14 
The U.S. military is dedicated to incorporating autonomous 
capabilities in drones "where it increases overall effectiveness. "15 
These advantages also account for drones' Achilles heel, extreme 
reliance on GPS guidance and communications satellites.16 Still, 
much information on the technical vulnerabilities of drones, such as 
electronic jamming, remains classified.17 
B. Legal Issue 
Employing Hellfire missiles and laser-guided munitions, 18 drone 
strikes usually result in the death of the target, which is typically 
referred to as a "targeted killing." Targeted killing is legally defined 
as an "intentional, premeditated and deliberate use of lethal force by 
[a] State ... against a specific individual who is not in the physical 
custody of the [State employing the lethal force]." 19 Prior to the War 
8. Id. at 34-36. 
9. Id. at 39-40 (the "large-sized" drones can parallel large manned aircraft 
in size). 
10. Flight Plan, supra note 2, at 15; Flight of the Drones, supra note 2. 
11. Flight Plan, supra note 2, at 15; Flight of the Drones, supra note 2. 
12. Flight Plan, supra note 2, at 16. 
13. Flight of the Drones, supra note 2. 
14. See Flight Plan, supra note 2, at 33. 
15. Id. at 33, 41. 
16. Flight of the Drones, supra note 2; Flight Plan, supra note 2, at 45. 
17. See Flight Plan, supra note 2, at 21-24. 
18. Flight of the Drones, supra note 2. 
19. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, 
Study on Targeted Killings, , 1, U.N Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/14/24/ Add.6 (May 28, 2010) (by Philip Alston); see also 
Richard Murphy & Afsheen John Radsan, Due Process and Targeted 
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buildings8 and "large-sized" drones with functions like air refueling 
platforms.9 
Drones offer numerous military advantages. Most importantly, 
drones operate without an on-board pilot, eliminating the risk to 
human life and allowing for dangerous missions into contested 
airspace.10 Drones are also cheaper, in part because of the reduction 
in size and number of systems that were necessary for on-board 
pilots, 11 and reduced training costs due the ability of simulators to 
provide all necessary training. 12 Furthermore, drones are typically 
more effective than most manned aircraft, offering more accurate 
strikes, stealthier capabilities, and the ability for extended airborne 
loiter. 13 Drones also offer increased autonomy, especially because 
take-offs and landings are nearly independent of human assistance.14 
The U.S. military is dedicated to incorporating autonomous 
capabilities in drones "where it increases overall effectiveness. "15 
These advantages also account for drones' Achilles heel, extreme 
reliance on GPS guidance and communications satellites.16 Still, 
much information on the technical vulnerabilities of drones, such as 
electronic jamming, remains classified.17 
B. Legal Issue 
Employing Hellfire missiles and laser-guided munitions, 18 drone 
strikes usually result in the death of the target, which is typically 
referred to as a "targeted killing." Targeted killing is legally defined 
as an "intentional, premeditated and deliberate use of lethal force by 
[a] State ... against a specific individual who is not in the physical 
custody of the [State employing the lethal force]." 19 Prior to the War 
8. Id. at 34-36. 
9. Id. at 39-40 (the "large-sized" drones can parallel large manned aircraft 
in size). 
10. Flight Plan, supra note 2, at 15; Flight of the Drones, supra note 2. 
11. Flight Plan, supra note 2, at 15; Flight of the Drones, supra note 2. 
12. Flight Plan, supra note 2, at 16. 
13. Flight of the Drones, supra note 2. 
14. See Flight Plan, supra note 2, at 33. 
15. Id. at 33, 41. 
16. Flight of the Drones, supra note 2; Flight Plan, supra note 2, at 45. 
17. See Flight Plan, supra note 2, at 21-24. 
18. Flight of the Drones, supra note 2. 
19. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, 
Study on Targeted Killings, , 1, U.N Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/14/24/ Add.6 (May 28, 2010) (by Philip Alston); see also 
Richard Murphy & Afsheen John Radsan, Due Process and Targeted 
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on Terror, the United States repudiated targeted killings; however, 
since the September 11 attacks, the United States has employed 
targeted killings with increased frequency. 20 Despite the 
Government's refusal to comment on the existence of a targeted 
killing program, 21 it is widely believed22 that the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) is responsible for the program. 23 According to a former 
CIA General Counsel, the program functions as a hit list, with drone 
strikes as the typical modus operandi.24 Such a revelation is not 
surprising given the considerable increase of drone strikes under the 
Obama Administration. 25 
There have been numerous proponents arguing the legality of 
employing drones in the War on Terror. However, these arguments 
are somewhat limited for the purposes of this Note, considering the 
common assumption is that the target is foreign national, rather than 
a U.S. citizen. This Note is limited to the domestic procedural due 
process issues surrounding drone strikes on U.S. citizens. Discussion 
of international legal issues regarding drone strikes in general and 
specifically on U.S. citizens is detailed in numerous other works.26 
Various questions need to be addressed, including: does the calculus 
Killing of Terrorist, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 405, 405 (2009) (suggesting 
that the definition of targeted killings include "extrajudicial"). 
20. Peter Bergen & Katherine Tiedemann, Washington's Phantom War: 
The Effects of the U.S. Drone Program on Pakistan, 90 FOREIGN AFF., 
16 Aug. (2011) at 12-18. 
21. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11 (D.D.C. 2010) ("The United 
States has neither confirmed nor denied the allegation that it has 
[authorized the particular drone strike at issue in the case]"); Scott 
Shane, Yemen Sets Terms on a War with Al-Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3 
2010, at Al (describing leaked information that shows Yemeni leaders 
taking responsibility for U.S. strikes to avoid anti-American backlash). 
22. Shane, supra note 21. 
23. Tara McKelvey, Inside the Killing Machine, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 13, 2011, 
at 34. 
24. Id. 
25. Id.; Alexander, supra note 3. 
26. Robert Chesney, Who May be Killed'? Anwar al-Awlaki as a Case Study 
in the International Legal Regulation of Lethal Force, M.N. Schmitt et. 
al. (eds.), 13 Y.B. of Int'l Humanitarian L.3 (2010); Michael Ramsden, 
Targeted Killings and International Human Rights Law: The Case of 
Anwar Al-Awlaki, Vol. 16 No. 2 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 385 (2011); 
Gabriella Blum & Philip Heymann, Law and Policy of Targeted Killing, 
lHARV. NAT'L SEC. L.J. 145 (2010); Jordan J. Paust, Self-Defense 
Targetings of Non-State Actors and Permissibility of U.S. Use of 
Drones in Pakistan, 19 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 237 (2010); Special 
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Study 
on Targeted Killings, supra note 19. 
134 
JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY&THElNTERNET. VOL. 4. No. I· 2012 
Drone Strikes on Citizens 
change when the intended target of the strike is a U.S. citizen 
engaged in terrorist activities? And, is there a method to preserve the 
individual's due process right while addressing the national security 
interests at stake? 
The Fifth Amendment states, "[n]o person shall be ... deprived 
of life ... without the due process of law. "27 The Constitution 
provides no direct instruction as to whether the Fifth Amendment's 
Due Process Clause is nullified by an individual's actions. This Note 
is an attempt to offer a legal solution to protect a citizens' due 
process rights while providing the necessary discretion to the 
Government to ensure national security. This Note provides that 
solution in the context of the Fifth Amendment and proposes a 
judicial proceeding and test for such circumstances. 
C. Proposed Procedural Due Process Solution 
In order to meet the unique legal challenges identified in the 
preceding section, a solution must account for "the obligation[s] of a 
civil, democratic society to respect and uphold the rule of law, "28 
while enacting proper safeguards to ensure national security. I 
propose that before the Government can legally conduct a drone 
strike on a citizen alleged to be engaged in terrorist activities abroad, 
it must first seek approval before the D.C. Circuit Court or a court 
modeled on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Court to 
meet the demands of procedural due process. The details and 
elements of the test will be discussed later in the Note. 29 
D. Anwar Al-Aulaqi Scenario 
The debate over the legality of drone attacks on citizens greatly 
intensified on September 30, 2011, when Al-Aulaqi, a natural-born 
U.S. citizen, and Samir Khan, a naturalized U.S. citizen, were killed 
by a drone strike in Yemen. 30 Al-Aulaqi was a radical Muslim cleric 
and external operations leader for Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
(AQAP).31 He was described as the 'Osama bin Laden of the 
Internet' for his propensity to recruit potential terrorists and to 
27. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
28. Amos N. Guiora, Where are the Terrorists to be Tried: A Comparative 
Analysis of Rights Granted to Suspected Terrorists, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 
805, 805 (2011). 
29. See infra Part III(A). 
30. Peter Finn & Sudarsan Raghavan, Yemeni al-Qaeda Took a Blow but 
Remains a Threat to U.S., WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 2011, at Al. 
31. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 
727 F.Supp.2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2010) (No. 10-CV-1469) [hereinafter Al-
Aulaqi Complaint]. 
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Killing of Terrorist, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 405, 405 (2009) (suggesting 
that the definition of targeted killings include "extrajudicial"). 
20. Peter Bergen & Katherine Tiedemann, Washington's Phantom War: 
The Effects of the U.S. Drone Program on Pakistan, 90 FOREIGN AFF., 
16 Aug. (2011) at 12-18. 
21. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11 (D.D.C. 2010) ("The United 
States has neither confirmed nor denied the allegation that it has 
[authorized the particular drone strike at issue in the case]"); Scott 
Shane, Yemen Sets Terms on a War with Al-Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3 
2010, at Al (describing leaked information that shows Yemeni leaders 
taking responsibility for U.S. strikes to avoid anti-American backlash). 
22. Shane, supra note 21. 
23. Tara McKelvey, Inside the Killing Machine, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 13, 2011, 
at 34. 
24. Id. 
25. Id.; Alexander, supra note 3. 
26. Robert Chesney, Who May be Killed'? Anwar al-Awlaki as a Case Study 
in the International Legal Regulation of Lethal Force, M.N. Schmitt et. 
al. (eds.), 13 Y.B. of Int'l Humanitarian L.3 (2010); Michael Ramsden, 
Targeted Killings and International Human Rights Law: The Case of 
Anwar Al-Awlaki, Vol. 16 No. 2 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 385 (2011); 
Gabriella Blum & Philip Heymann, Law and Policy of Targeted Killing, 
lHARV. NAT'L SEC. L.J. 145 (2010); Jordan J. Paust, Self-Defense 
Targetings of Non-State Actors and Permissibility of U.S. Use of 
Drones in Pakistan, 19 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 237 (2010); Special 
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Study 
on Targeted Killings, supra note 19. 
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27. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
28. Amos N. Guiora, Where are the Terrorists to be Tried: A Comparative 
Analysis of Rights Granted to Suspected Terrorists, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 
805, 805 (2011). 
29. See infra Part III(A). 
30. Peter Finn & Sudarsan Raghavan, Yemeni al-Qaeda Took a Blow but 
Remains a Threat to U.S., WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 2011, at Al. 
31. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 
727 F.Supp.2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2010) (No. 10-CV-1469) [hereinafter Al-
Aulaqi Complaint]. 
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spread propaganda through the Internet, especially using YouTube.32 
Al-Aulaqi was especially effective at influencing fellow U.S. citizens 
due to his ability to speak American-accented English and his strong 
command of Arabic; "[Al-Aulaqi] was able to transition seamlessly 
between the two languages, creating an aura of religious authenticity 
with his English-speaking followers. "33 After gaining notoriety for 
jihadist propaganda, Al-Aulaqi took on an increased operational and 
planning function for AQAP.34 
In 2010, the Obama Administration denoted Al-Aulaqi as a 
Specially Designated Global Terrorist35 and allegedly placed him on a 
pre-approved list of terror suspects for targeted killing. 36 Al-Aulaqi 
was deemed an AQAP leader that "recruited individuals to join 
AQAP, facilitated training at camps in Yemen in support of acts of 
terrorism, and helped to focus AQAP's attention on attacking U.S. 
interests."37 Under Obama Administration policy, the National 
Security Council had to specially approve Al-Aulaqi's addition to the 
targeted kill list since he was a U.S. citizen.38 The Administration 
justified adding Al-Aulaqi to the list by claiming that he was an 
imminent threat to Americans, was engaged in armed conflict against 
the United States, and there existed no.viable means to arrest him. 39 
Al-Aulaqi was undoubtedly an imminent threat to Americans. 
Allegations of Al-Aulaqi's influence were abundant; he had been 
associated with numerous terror attacks and plots in recent years. 40 
32. Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 10; Aamer Madhani, Cleric Al-Awlaki 
Dubbed "Bin Laden of the Internet," USA TODAY, Aug. 24, 2010. 
33. Robert J. Delahunty & Christopher J. Motz, Killing al-Awlaki: The 
Domestic Legal Issues, 1 IDAHO J. L. & POL'Y 1 (forthcoming 2012); 
Finn & Raghavan, supra note 30. 
34. Delahunty & Motz, supra note 33, at 9. 
35. Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 10; OFAC Designation - Designation of 
Anwar Al-Aulaqi Pursuant to Exec. Order 13224 and the Global 
Terrorism Sanctions Regs., 31 C.F.R Part 594, 75 Fed. Reg. 43233 (July 
16, 2010). 
36. Shane, supra note 21. 
37. Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction and 
Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 5, Al-
Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (No. 10-CV-1469) 
[hereinafter Al-Aulaqi Response]; see also Public Declaration of James 
R. Clapper, Dir. of Nat'l Intelligence (DNI), Exhibit 1, , 13, 
Unclassified Declaration in Support of Formal Claim of State Secrets 
Privilege. 
38. Scott Shane, Judging a Long, Deadly Reach, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2011, 
at Al. 
39. Id. 
40. Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 10. 
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Nidal Malik Hasan, a U.S. Army Major, admitted that Al-Aulaqi 
compelled him to commit the 2009 Fort Hood Shooting Attack.41 
Moreover, Al-Aulaqi is alleged to have trained and instructed Umar 
Farouk Abdulmutallab, who attempted the 2009· underwear bombing 
onboard Northwest Airlines Flight 253.42 Al-Aulaqi also allegedly 
helped plan the 2010 Cargo Plane Bomb Plot43 and aided the 
unsuccessful bombing of Times Square by Faisal Shahzad in 2010.44 
In August 2010, Al-Aulaqi's father brought suit against the 
United States, claiming the Government unlawfully authorized the 
targeted killing of Al-Aulaqi in violation of Al-Aulaqi's Fifth 
Amendment due process rights.45 Al-Aulaqi's father sought an 
injunction, stating that the Government had not provided adequate 
evidence that Al-Aulaqi posed a "concrete, specific, and imminent 
threat to life or physical safety" and it failed to show that there were 
"no means other than lethal force that could reasonably be employed 
to neutralize the threat. "46 The Government responded, stating that 
targeting Al-Aulaqi was solely in the authority of the Executive, and 
any judicial foray into the matter would be a violation of separation 
of powers.47 Specifically, the Government asserted that Al-Aulaqi 
constituted an imminent threat to national security. 48 The District 
Court granted summary judgment to the Government, finding Al-
Aulaqi's father did not have legal standing to challenge Al-Aulaqi's 
targeting and holding the court did not have authority to decide the 
case due to the political question doctrine.49 The dismissal of the case 
on procedural grounds leaves open a constitutional chasm in deciding 
how a citizen's due process rights overlay the Government's national 
security responsibility in such circumstances. 
It may seem as though a drone strike on a citizen is so unlikely a 
situation that it should be considered an aberration. However, the 
Al-Aulaqi killing was not the first time a U.S. drone strike had 
resulted in the death of a citizen. In November 2002, Ahmed Hijazi, a 
41. Id. 
42. Id.; OFAC Designation, supra note 35. 
43. Finn & Raghavan, supra note 30 (explaining that the '2010 Cargo Plane 
B.omb Plot' resulted in the crash of a cargo plane, causing two deaths; a 
second bomb was found on another plane, but was removed without 
incident). 
44. Id. 
45. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2010). The suit also 
included claims that the Government violated the Alien Tort Statute. 
46. Al-Aulaqi, 727 F.Supp.2d at 8. 
47. Al-Aulaqi Response, supra note 37, at 3. 
48. Id. at 5. 
49. Al-Aulaqi, 727 F.Supp.2d at 57. 
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spread propaganda through the Internet, especially using YouTube.32 
Al-Aulaqi was especially effective at influencing fellow U.S. citizens 
due to his ability to speak American-accented English and his strong 
command of Arabic; "[Al-Aulaqi] was able to transition seamlessly 
between the two languages, creating an aura of religious authenticity 
with his English-speaking followers. "33 After gaining notoriety for 
jihadist propaganda, Al-Aulaqi took on an increased operational and 
planning function for A QAP. 34 
In 2010, the Obama Administration denoted Al-Aulaqi as a 
Specially Designated Global Terrorist35 and allegedly placed him on a 
pre-approved list of terror suspects for targeted killing.36 Al-Aulaqi 
was deemed an AQAP leader that "recruited individuals to join 
AQAP, facilitated training at camps in Yemen in support of acts of 
terrorism, and helped to focus AQAP's attention on attacking U.S. 
interests."37 Under Obama Administration policy, the National 
Security Council had to specially approve Al-Aulaqi's addition to the 
targeted kill list since he was a U.S. citizen.38 The Administration 
justified adding Al-Aulaqi to the list by claiming that he was an 
imminent threat to Americans, was engaged in armed conflict against 
the United States, and there existed no.viable means to arrest him.39 
Al-Aulaqi was undoubtedly an imminent threat to Americans. 
Allegations of Al-Aulaqi's influence were abundant; he had been 
associated with numerous terror attacks and plots in recent years.40 
32. Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 10; Aamer Madhani, Cleric Al-Awlaki 
Dubbed "Bin Laden of the Internet," USA TODAY, Aug. 24, 2010. 
33. Robert J. Delahunty & Christopher J. Motz, Killing al-Awlaki: The 
Domestic Legal Issues, 1 IDAHO J. L. & POL'Y 1 (forthcoming 2012); 
Finn & Raghavan, supra note 30. 
34. Delahunty & Motz, supra note 33, at 9. 
35. Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 10; OFAC Designation - Designation of 
Anwar Al-Aulaqi Pursuant to Exec. Order 13224 and the Global 
Terrorism Sanctions Regs., 31 C.F.R Part 594, 75 Fed. Reg. 43233 (July 
16, 2010). 
36. Shane, supra note 21. 
37. Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction and 
Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 5, Al-
Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (No. 10-CV-1469) 
[hereinafter Al-Aulaqi Response]; see also Public Declaration of James 
R. Clapper, Dir. of Nat'l Intelligence (DNI), Exhibit 1, , 13, 
Unclassified Declaration in Support of Formal Claim of State Secrets 
Privilege. 
38. Scott Shane, Judging a Long, Deadly Reach, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2011, 
at Al. 
39. Id. 
40. Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 10. 
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Nidal Malik Hasan, a U.S. Army Major, admitted that Al-Aulaqi 
compelled him to commit the 2009 Fort Hood Shooting Attack.41 
Moreover, Al-Aulaqi is alleged to have trained and instructed Umar 
Farouk Abdulmutallab, who attempted the 2009· underwear bombing 
onboard Northwest Airlines Flight 253.42 Al-Aulaqi also allegedly 
helped plan the 2010 Cargo Plane Bomb Plot43 and aided the 
unsuccessful bombing of Times Square by Faisal Shahzad in 2010.44 
In August 2010, Al-Aulaqi's father brought suit against the 
United States, claiming the Government unlawfully authorized the 
targeted killing of Al-Aulaqi in violation of Al-Aulaqi's Fifth 
Amendment due process rights.45 Al-Aulaqi's father sought an 
injunction, stating that the Government had not provided adequate 
evidence that Al-Aulaqi posed a "concrete, specific, and imminent 
threat to life or physical safety" and it failed to show that there were 
"no means other than lethal force that could reasonably be employed 
to neutralize the threat. "46 The Government responded, stating that 
targeting Al-Aulaqi was solely in the authority of the Executive, and 
any judicial foray into the matter would be a violation of separation 
of powers.47 Specifically, the Government asserted that Al-Aulaqi 
constituted an imminent threat to national security. 48 The District 
Court granted summary judgment to the Government, finding Al-
Aulaqi's father did not have legal standing to challenge Al-Aulaqi's 
targeting and holding the court did not have authority to decide the 
case due to the political question doctrine.49 The dismissal of the case 
on procedural grounds leaves open a constitutional chasm in deciding 
how a citizen's due process rights overlay the Government's national 
security responsibility in such circumstances. 
It may seem as though a drone strike on a citizen is so unlikely a 
situation that it should be considered an aberration. However, the 
Al-Aulaqi killing was not the first time a U.S. drone strike had 
resulted in the death of a citizen. In November 2002, Ahmed Hijazi, a 
41. Id. 
42. Id.; OF AC Designation, supra note 35. 
43. F!nn & Raghavan, supra note 30 (explaining that the '2010 Cargo Plane 
Bomb Plot' resulted in the crash of a cargo plane, causing two deaths; a 
second bomb was found on another plane, but was removed without 
incident). 
44. Id. 
45. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2010). The suit also 
included claims that the Government violated the Alien Tort Statute. 
46. Al-Aulaqi, 727 F.Supp.2d at 8. 
47. Al-Aulaqi Response, supra note 37, at 3. 
48. Id. at 5. 
49. Al-Aulaqi, 727 F.Supp.2d at 57. 
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suspected Al-Qaeda operative and naturalized citizen, was killed in 
Y eII1.en. 50 The discourse regarding the legality of this drone strike was 
not as rampant as after the Al-Aulaqi strike, perhaps because Hijazi 
was a lesser-known figure and due to the pervading conciliatory mood 
toward counterterrorism action immediately following the September 
11 attacks. Nevertheless, the Hijazi, Al-Aulaqi, and Khan killings, in 
addition to the inevitability that other citizens will engage in 
terrorism, like Major Hasan and Faisal Shahzad, lead. to the 
incontrovertible conclusion that drone strikes on citizens is a pressing 
issue. This conclusion, taken with a broad interpretation of the Al-
A ulaqi holding (that the Executive is at liberty to target citizens 
abroad without any measure of procedural due process if it deems 
those citizens are threats to national security), 51 creates a frightening 
prospect. Such a confluence of practical realities and legal precedent 
creates outcomes that violate the Constitution, necessitating the 
implementation of procedural due process safeguards. 
II. DISCUSSION 
Concerning the use of force against terrorists, the U.S. 
Government has largely relied on self-defense under international law. 
As stated by State Department Legal Advisor Harold Koh, "the 
United States is in an armed conflict with Al-Qaeda . . . and 
associated forces, in response to the horrific 9 /11 attacks, and may 
use force consistent with its inherent right to self-defense under 
international law ... including lethal force, to defend itself. "52 In fact, 
most legal scholarship concerning targeted killings and drone attacks 
focuses on international law.53 Perhaps mainstream legal scholarship 
will conclude that international law justifies drone strikes on citizens 
despite constitutional due process concerns; however, those discussions 
exceed the scope of this Note. The focus of this Note is to propose a 
solution providing Fifth Amendment due process rights to citizens 
engaged in terrorism abroad, while permitting the Executive to defend 
the nation with minimal impediment. 
50. Dana Priest, CIA Killed U.S. Citizen in Yemen Missile Strike: Action's 
Legality, Effectiveness Questioned, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 2002, at Al; 
James Risen, Drone Attack: An American Was A inong 6 Killed by U.S., 
Yemenis Say, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2002, at A13. 
51. Benjamin McKelvey, Due Process Rights and the Targeted Killing of 
Suspected Terrorists: The Unconstitutional Scope of Executive Killing 
Power, 44 V AND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1353, 1363 (2011). 
52. Harold Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State, Keynote Address at the 
Annual Meeting of the Am. Soc'y of Int'l Law: The Obama 
Administration and International Law (Mar. 25, 2010). 
53. Murphy & Radsan, supra note 19, at 409. 
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As argued below, citizens engaged in terrorist activities in foreign 
countries maintain their constitutional procedural due. process rights. 
Supreme Court precedent on Fifth Amendment due process rights 
holds that these rights remain intact despite the citizen being outside 
U.S. jurisdiction.54 Furthermore, Supreme Court precedent regarding 
detainees in the War on Terror reveals that citizens and non-citizens 
alike are entitled to due process rights. Therefore, the current policy 
of targeted killings via drone strikes on such citizens, only subject to 
internal controls by the Executiye, is unconstitutional. 
The Government has also attempted to justify the targeted 
killings of citizens by connecting the citizen's terrorist activities to the 
AUMF,55 which granted the Executive power to take necessary action 
to prevent future attacks from entities connected to the September 11 
attacks.56 However, as argued below, the AUMF does not remove the 
demands of procedural due process, and the Government's attempted 
connections between targeted citizens and the perpetrators of the 
September 11 attacks have become more tenuous and strained. 
A. Fifth Amendment - Due Process Clause 
The text of the Fifth Amendment states "[n]o person shall be ... 
deprived of life ... without due process of law. "57 Drone strikes 
undoubtedly constitute an attempt by the Government to deprive a 
citizen of his life. As evidenced by the Al-A ulaqi case, the 
Government has declined to afford targeted citizens any measure of 
due process before a drone strike by contending that judicial review is 
improper. 58 However, such Government actions unconstitutionally 
deprive citizens of due process rights when drone strikes are 
conducted. 
Procedural due process refers to the minimum procedural 
requirements the Government must meet before taking action against 
a citizen. "Procedural due process imposes restraints on 
governmental decisions which deprive individuals of liberty . . . 
interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
[Amendrnent]."59 But while procedural due process describes a liberty 
interest within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
54. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 21 (1957). 
55. Authorization for Use of Military Force, S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong., Pub. 
L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified as 50 U.S.C. § 1541, § 2a 
(2006)). 
56. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 24 (D.D.C. 2010); Ramsden, 
supra note 26, at 396. 
57. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
58. Al-Aulaqi, 727 F.Supp.2d 1 at 8. 
59. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). 
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suspected Al-Qaeda operative and naturalized citizen, was killed in 
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creates outcomes that violate the Constitution, necessitating the 
implementation of procedural due process safeguards. 
II. DISCUSSION 
Concerning the use of force against terrorists, the U.S. 
Government has largely relied on self-defense under international law. 
As stated by State Department Legal Advisor Harold Koh, "the 
United States is in an armed conflict with Al-Qaeda . . . and 
associated forces, in response to the horrific 9 /11 attacks, and may 
use force consistent with its inherent right to self-defense under 
international law ... including lethal force, to defend itself. "52 In fact, 
most legal scholarship concerning targeted killings and drone attacks 
focuses on international law.53 Perhaps mainstream legal scholarship 
will conclude that international law justifies drone strikes on citizens 
despite constitutional due process concerns; however, those discussions 
exceed the scope of this Note. The focus of this Note is to propose a 
solution providing Fifth Amendment due process rights to citizens 
engaged in terrorism abroad, while permitting the Executive to defend 
the nation with minimal impediment. 
50. Dana Priest, CIA Killed U.S. Citizen in Yemen Missile Strike: Action's 
Legality, Effectiveness Questioned, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 2002, at Al; 
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138 
JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY& THE INTERNET· VOL. 4 ·No. I· 2012 
Drone Strikes on Citizens 
As argued below, citizens engaged in terrorist activities in foreign 
countries maintain their constitutional procedural due. process rights. 
Supreme Court precedent on Fifth Amendment due process rights 
holds that these rights remain intact despite the citizen being outside 
U.S. jurisdiction.54 Furthermore, Supreme Court precedent regarding 
detainees in the War on Terror reveals that citizens and non-citizens 
alike are entitled to due process rights. Therefore, the current policy 
of targeted killings via drone strikes on such citizens, only subject to 
internal controls by the Executiye, is unconstitutional. 
The Government has also attempted to justify the targeted 
killings of citizens by connecting the citizen's terrorist activities to the 
A.UMF,55 which granted the J?xecutive power to take necessary action 
to prevent future attacks from entities connected to the September 11 
attacks.56 However, as argued below, the AUMF does not remove the 
demands of procedural due process, and the Government's attempted 
connections between targeted citizens and the perpetrators of the 
September 11 attacks have become more tenuous and strained. 
A. Fifth Amendment - Due Process Clause 
The text of the Fifth Amendment states "[n]o person shall be ... 
deprived of life ... without due process of law. "57 Drone strikes 
undoubtedly constitute an attempt by the Government to deprive a 
citizen of his life. As evidenced by the Al-Aulaqi case, the 
Government has declined to afford targeted citizens any measure of 
due process before a drone strike by contending that judicial review is 
improper. 58 However, such Government actions unconstitutionally 
deprive citizens of due process rights when drone strikes are 
conducted. 
Procedural due process refers to the minimum procedural 
requirements the Government must meet before taking action against 
a citizen. "Procedural due process imposes restraints on 
governmental decisions which deprive individuals of liberty . . . 
interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
[Amendment]."59 But while procedural due process describes a liberty 
interest within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
54. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 21 (1957). 
55. Authorization for Use of Military Force, S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong., Pub. 
L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified as 50 U.S.C. § 1541, § 2a 
(2006)). 
56. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 24 (D.D.C. 2010); Ramsden, 
supra note 26, at 396. 
57. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
58. Al-Aulaqi, 727 F.Supp.2d 1 at 8. 
59. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). 
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Amendment,60 the Court has not been clear in defining what 
constitutes a liberty interest.61 However, a liberty interest undoubtedly 
incorporates the interest to not be killed by the Government without 
due process.62 There is little merit to an argument that a targeted 
killing does not seek to deprive a person of a liberty interest. 
In Mathews v. Eldridge, the Supreme Court provided a three-
factor balancing test to determine the sufficiency of due process 
procedures. 63 The first factor to be considered is "the private interest 
that will be affected by the official action. "64 The second factor 
entails "the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through 
the procedures used, and the probable value ... of additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards. "65 The final factor is "the 
Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal 
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute 
procedural requirement would entail. "66 
Regarding the first element, the private interest that will be 
impressed upon by government action, surely there can be no greater 
interest than one's life. With that precious interest in mind, the due 
process procedure that is "constitutionally due cannot be divorced 
from the nature of the ultimate decision that is being made; "67 in this 
case, the taking of a citizen's life. Thus, in considering drone strikes 
on citizens, the first element deserves the maximum weight 
attributable. 
The second element, wrongful deprivation of the private interest 
and the value obtained by additional procedures, again affords 
considerable merit to the implementation of some sort of procedural 
due process in the context of drone strikes. This factor must also 
carry the greatest possible weight, considering the only deprivation of 
a private interest that can be considered worse than being killed is to 
be killed erroneously. Thus, the value of developing "additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards" to prevent an erroneous killing is 
also quite considerable. 68 
60. Id. at 333. 
61. Bd. of Reg. of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972). 
62. . Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004) (Hamdi's freedom 
constituted a liberty right that invoked the Mathews balancing test). 




67. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 608 (1979). 
68. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. 
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The final element in the Mathews test concerns the Government's 
interest, which in this context is national security. National security 
is certainly a compelling interest and is perhaps the foremost function 
of Government.69 Yet, implementing due process procedures in this 
context would impose a minimal burden on the Government. The 
Government alleges that a rigorous internal legal analysis is ' 
conducted before placing a person on the targeted killing list, and 
that the process is even more stringent for U.S. citizens.70 Therefore, 
the Government should have no difficulty in submitting such 
information to judicial review to afford targeted citizens their 
constitutionally mandated due process rights. As discussed below, the 
proposed procedural solution entails safeguards for secrecy, expedited 
proceedings to allow for prompt military action, and other 
considerations to address national security concerns.71 
The Mathews test, when applied to drone strikes on citizens, 
firmly establishes that the implementation of procedural due process 
safeguards is the correct outcome. The two initial factors · hold 
immense weight in favor of the implementation of procedural due 
process measures. Although the Executive claims its internal vetting 
process for subjecting citizens to a targeted killing is scrupulous, such 
procedures are secret and conducted with no external oversight.72 Of 
the three notable due process interests-life, liberty, and property-
life is the only interest that once taken can never be restored, and the 
function of the legal process is to minimize the risk of erroneous 
decisions. 73 Thus, the implementation of procedural safeguards to 
prevent such an outcome carries extensive value. Furthermore, the 
proceeding imposes a limited burden on the Government that does 
not endanger national security. Thus, the implementation of the 
proposed proceeding would ensure a commitment to the rule of law 
and constitutional mandates, provide increased legitimacy when the 
Government conducts drone strikes on citizens suspected of terrorism 
abroad, and provide the citizen with procedural due process. 
69. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) ("It is 'obvious and unarguable' 
that no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of 
the Nation." (quoting Aptheker v. Sec'y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 508 
(1964)). 
70. Shane, supra note 38. 
71. See infra Part III( C). 
72. McKelvey, supra note 23; Koh, supra note 52 (Koh described the 
Executive branch's method for determining individuals subjected to 
targeted killings was "extremely robust," but did not offer details on the 
process). 
73. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. 
at 335). 
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The final element in the Mathews test concerns the Government's 
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is certainly a compelling interest and is perhaps the foremost function 
of Government. 69 Yet, implementing due process procedures in this 
context would impose a minimal burden on the Government. The 
Government alleges that a rigorous internal legal analysis is ' 
conducted before placing a person on the targeted killing list, and 
that the process is even more stringent for U.S. citizens. 70 Therefore, 
the Government should have no difficulty in submitting such 
information to judicial review to afford targeted citizens their 
constitutionally mandated due process rights. As discussed below, the 
proposed procedural solution entails safeguards for secrecy, expedited 
proceedings to allow for prompt military action, and other 
considerations to address national security concerns. 71 
The Mathews test, when applied to drone strikes on citizens, 
firmly establishes that the implementation of procedural due process 
safeguards is the correct outcome. The two initial factors · hold 
immense weight in favor of the implementation of procedural due 
process measures. Although the Executive claims its internal vetting 
process for subjecting citizens to a targeted killing is scrupulous, such 
procedures are secret and conducted with no external oversight.72 Of 
the three notable due process interests-life, liberty, and property-
life is the only interest that once taken can never be restored, and the 
function of the legal process is to minimize the risk of erroneous 
decisions. 73 Thus, the implementation of procedural safeguards to 
prevent such an outcome carries extensive value. Furthermore, the 
proceeding imposes a limited burden on the Government that does 
not endanger national security. Thus, the implementation of the 
proposed proceeding would ensure a commitment to the rule of law 
and constitutional mandates, provide increased legitimacy when the 
Government conducts drone strikes on citizens suspected of terrorism 
abroad, and provide the citizen with procedural due process. 
69. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) ("It is 'obvious and unarguable' 
that no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of 
the Nation." (quoting Aptheker v. Sec'y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 508 
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70. Shane, supra note 38. 
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72. McKelvey, supra note 23; Koh, supra note 52 (Koh described the 
Executive branch's method for determining individuals subjected to 
targeted killings was "extremely robust," but did not offer details on the 
process). 
73. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. 
at 335). 
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The fact that this proposed proceeding is novel does not upset the 
conditions of procedural due process. "Due process ... is not a 
technical conception with a fixed content umelated to time, place and 
circumstances ... due process is flexible and calls for such procedural 
protections as the particular situation demands. "74 "No single model 
of procedural fairness, let alone a particular form of procedure, is 
dictated by the Due Process Clause."75 Moreover, "[t]he very nature 
of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally 
applicable to every imaginable situation. "76 
The Supreme Court has held that constitutional protections 
accompany a citizen when abroad. In Reid v. Covert, the Court held 
that citizens are protected by the Constitution when outside U.S. 
jurisdiction.77 Reid concerned two cases, both involving a woman 
convicted in a military court for the murder of her U.S. armed forces 
personnel husband while on a foreign U.S. military base. 78 The Court 
found the Constitution prohibited citizens from being tried by 
military authorities. 79 "When the Government reaches out to punish a 
citizen who is abroad, the shield which the Bill of Rights and other 
parts of the Constitution provide to protect his life and liberty should 
not be stripped away just because he happens to be in another 
land. "80 Indeed, constitutional due process protections remain with 
citizens when abroad.81 Thus, in the context of drone strikes, Reid 
supports the view that the Constitution prevents the Government 
from denying a citizen procedural due process just because the 
Government seeks to act upon that citizen outside U.S. jurisdiction.82 
74. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334. 
75. Kremer v. Chemical Const. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 483 (1982). 
76. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Corp., 416 U.S. 600, 610 (1974). 
77. 354 U.S. 1, 5 (1957) (Reid further emphasized the Constitution applies 
abroad by repudiating In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891), which held the 
Constitution has no operation in another country. Reid repudiated Ross 
by stating that the opinion was "obviously erroneous" and "should be 
left as a relic from a different era." Reid, 354 U.S. at 12); See Murphy & 
Radsan, supra note 19, at 429-37 (contending that Boumediene v. Bush, 
553 U.S. 723 (2008), also subjects the Government to due-process 
restrictions wherever it acts in the world). 
78. Reid, 354 U.S. at 4. 
79. Id. at 5. 
80. Id. at 6. 
81. Id. 
82. William C. Banks & Peter Raven-Hansen, Targeted Killing and 
Assassination: The U.S. Legal Framework, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 667, 675 
(2002); Reid, 354 U.S. at 1 ("[T]he U.S. is entirely a creature of the 
Constitution. Its power and authority have no other source . . . [the 
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B. Analogizing to Recent Supreme Court Detainee Cases 
In the past decade, the Supreme Court has established that 
detainees from the War on Terror are afforded some amount of 
procedural due process rights. In Hamdi v. Rumsfelrl'3 and 
Boumediene v. Bush,84 the Court held that both citizens and non-
citizens have a constitutional right to writs of habeas corpus in federal 
court.85 Thus, these cases insinuate that the current Government 
policy in conducting drone strikes on citizens without due process 
procedures is unconstitutional. 
1. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 
In Hamdi, a U.S. citizen was declared an enemy combatant after 
allegedly fighting for the Taliban in Afghanistan.86 While being held 
in a military base in the United States, Hamdi filed a writ of habeas 
corpus, arguing his Fifth Amendment due process rights were being 
violated by his indefinite detention and denial of right to counsel and 
trial. The Government claimed it had a right to detain enemy 
combatants during wartime and, thus, Hamdi had no right to due 
process.87 
The four Justice plurality, authored by Justice O'Connor, held 
the AUMF did authorize the Executive to detain U.S. citizens as 
enemy combatants;88 however, such detainees retain basic due process 
rights.89 Further, the plurality found the Fifth Amendment ensures 
that a citizen detained as an enemy combatant must, at minimum, be 
given notice of the factual basis for his designation as an enemy 
combatant and an opportunity to contest the detention before a 
neutral decision-maker. 90 Yet, the exigencies of the situation, namely 
that Hamdi was deemed an enemy combatant, dictated that Hamdi 
U.S.] can only act in accordance with all the limitations imposed by the 
Constitution."). 
83. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (O'Connor, J., plurality) 
(holding, with the assent of the majority of the Court, that American 
citizens held as enemy combatants were entitled to due process 
protections). 
84. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (holding that non-citizen 
detainees. at Guantanamo Bay had constitutional right to seek habeas 
corpus review in federal courts and that the contours of this review 
would be a function of due process principles). 
85. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 507; Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 723. 
86. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510. 
87. Id. at 513. 
88. Id. at 517-18. 
89. Id. at 521. 
90. Id. at 533. 
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of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally 
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The Supreme Court has held that constitutional protections 
accompany a citizen when abroad. In Reid v. Covert, the Court held 
that citizens are protected by the Constitution when outside U.S. 
jurisdiction.77 Reid concerned two cases, both involving a woman 
convicted in a military court for the murder of her U.S. armed forces 
personnel husband while on a foreign U.S. military base.78 The Court 
found the Constitution prohibited citizens from being tried by 
military authorities. 79 "When the Government reaches out to punish a 
citizen who is abroad, the shield which the Bill of Rights and other 
parts of the Constitution provide to protect his life and liberty should 
not be stripped away just because he happens to be in another 
land. "80 Indeed, constitutional due process protections remain with 
citizens when abroad.81 Thus, in the context of drone strikes, Reid 
supports the view that the Constitution prevents the Government 
from denying a citizen procedural due process just because the 
Government seeks to act upon that citizen outside U.S. jurisdiction.82 
74. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334. 
75. Kremer v. Chemical Const. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 483 (1982). 
76. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Corp., 416 U.S. 600, 610 (1974). 
77. 354 U.S. 1, 5 (1957) (Reid further emphasized the Constitution applies 
abroad by repudiating In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891), which held the 
Constitution has no operation in another country. Reid repudiated Ross 
by stating that the opinion was "obviously erroneous" and "should be 
left as a relic from a different era." Reid, 354 U.S. at 12); See Murphy & 
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81. Id. 
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(2002); Reid, 354 U.S. at 1 ("[T]he U.S. is entirely a creature of the 
Constitution. Its power and authority have no other source . . . [the 
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B. Analogizing to Recent Supreme Court Detainee Cases 
In the past decade, the Supreme Court has established that 
detainees from the War on Terror are afforded some amount of 
procedural due process rights. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld33 and 
Boumediene v. Bush,84 the Court held that both citizens and non-
citizens have a constitutional right to writs of habeas corpus in federal 
court.85 Thus, these cases insinuate that the current Government 
policy in conducting drone strikes on citizens without due process 
procedures is unconstitutional. 
1. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 
In Hamdi, a U.S. citizen was declared an enemy combatant after 
allegedly fighting for the Taliban in Afghanistan.86 While being held 
in a military base in the United States, Hamdi filed a writ of habeas 
corpus, arguing his Fifth Amendment due process rights were being 
violated by his indefinite detention and denial of right to counsel and 
trial. The Government claimed it had a right to detain enemy 
combatants during wartime and, thus, Hamdi had no right to due 
process.87 
The four Justice plurality, authored by Justice O'Connor, held 
the AUMF did authorize the Executive to detain U.S. citizens as 
enemy combatants;88 however, such detainees retain basic due process 
rights. 89 Further, the plurality found the Fifth Amendment ensures 
that a citizen detained as an enemy combatant must, at minimum, be 
given notice of the factual basis for his designation as an enemy 
combatant and an opportunity to contest the detention before a 
neutral decision-maker.90 Yet, the exigencies of the situation, namely 
that Hamdi was deemed an enemy combatant, dictated that Hamdi 
U.S.] can only act in accordance with all the limitations imposed by the 
Constitution."). 
83. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (O'Connor, J., plurality) 
(holding, with the assent of the majority of the Court, that American 
citizens held as enemy combatants were entitled to due process 
protections). 
84. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (holding that non-citizen 
detainees· at Guantanamo Bay had constitutional right to seek habeas 
corpus review in federal courts and that the contours of this review 
would be a function of due process principles). 
85. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 507; Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 723. 
86. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510. 
87. Id. at 513. 
88. Id. at 517-18. 
89. Id. at 521. 
90. Id. at 533. 
143 
JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY&THElNTERNET · VOL.4 · No.1·2012 
Drone Strikes on Citizens 
was not entitled to the functional equivalent of a trial. 91 Elements 
such as hearsay and a presumption in favor of Government evidence, 
as long as said presumption would be rebuttable, were identified as 
possible curtailments to alleviate the Executive's burden during 
military conflict.92 
Justice Souter, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, 
concurring in part and in the judgment, agreed that Hamdi had the 
right to challenge his enemy combatant status. Souter dissented in 
part, arguing the Executive did not have authority to detain citizens, 
except via an act of Congress, based on the Non-Detention Act.93 
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Stevens, dissented, arguing a strict 
civil liberties viewpoint and claiming the appropriate process for 
detaining a citizen accused of waging war against his country is 
prosecution for treason. 94 Thus, absent a congressional suspension of 
the writ of habeas corpus, the Government must prosecute Hamdi or 
release him. 95 
Justice Thomas adamantly dissented, arguing in favor of 
Executive branch discretion in conflict while noting the judiciary's 
lack of expertise in such inatters.96 Thomas contended the judiciary 
could examine whether the Executive held the power to detain enemy 
combatants,97 and that the Executive had such power, since the power 
to wage war necessitates the power to detain those who fight in 
opposition, even U.S. citizens.98 Thomas claimed that in the context 
of a detention of an enemy combatant, "due process requires nothing 
more than a good-faith executive determination. "99 
Despite the plurality's vague enunciation of what constitutes an 
adequate level of due process for detainees, the overall message ·of 
Hamdi is clear: citizen detainees are entitled to some form of due 
process, despite being declared enemy combatants. 100 Only Justice 
Thomas expressed a position that can be rectified with recent 
Executive pronouncement regarding drone strikes on citizens, what he 
91. Id. at 533-34. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. at 545-51 (Souter, J., concurring in part and in the judgment and 
dissenting in part). 
94. Id. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
95. Id. at 573. 
96. Id. at 579 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
97. Id. at 587. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. at 590. 
100. Id. at 521. 
144 
JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY& THE INTERNET· VOL. 4 ·No. l · 2012 
Drone Strikes on Citizens 
conceived of as a "good-faith executive determination. "101 
Furthermore, Justice Scalia advocated that if Hamdi was not released 
he must be prosecuted for treason, 102 which, in going beyond the due 
process requirements enunciated by the plurality, would result in the 
full due process procedures entailed in a criminal trial. Indeed, the 
citizen identified for targeted killing is more entitled to due process 
proceedings considering the finality of death compared to the 
restriction of liberty. Using Hamdi's reasoning, if a citizen that is 
deemed an enemy combatant is entitled to some form of due process 
when detained of liberty, it should follow that a citizen targeted for 
deprivation of life is also entitled to due process.103 
2. Boumediene v. Bush 
In accordance with Hamdi's mandate, the Government began 
conducting Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) to 
determine if each detainee was a threat and whether they should 
remain detained as enemy combatants.104 Following the suggestions 
proposed in Hamdi, the CSRTs entailed a presumption for 
Government evidence105 and allowed hearsay. 106 Additional 
restrictions on due process were also imposed, including denying the 
detainee access to classified information used as evidence, 107 and 
assigning the detainee a "Personal Representative."108 However, the 
personal representatives did not act as the detainee's lawyer, nor were 
they even an advocate for the detainee. 109 
In an attempt to counteract the Hamdi ruling, Congress enacted 
the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DT A), which removed 
jurisdiction from federal courts for non-citizen Guantanamo detainees 
and granted the D.C. Court of Appeals exclusive jurisdiction over 
101. Id. at 590 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
102. Id. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
103. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-358 (1977) ("[T]he action of the 
sovereign in taking the life of one of its citizens ... differs dramatically 
from any other legitimate state action"); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 
399, 411 (1986) (" [E]xecution is the most irremediable and unfathomable 
of penalties; that death is different"); O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 
151, 171 n.3 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]he unique character of 
the death penalty mandates special scrutiny of ... procedures in capital 
cases"). 
104. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 733 (2008). 
105. Id. at 767. 
106. Id. at 816. 
107. Id. at 784. 
108. Id. at 767. 
109. Id. 
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as long as said presumption would be rebuttable, were identified as 
possible curtailments to alleviate the Executive's burden during 
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concurring in part and in the judgment, agreed that Hamdi had the 
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conceived of as a "good-faith executive determination. "101 
Furthermore, Justice Scalia advocated that if Hamdi was not released 
he must be prosecuted for treason,102 which, in going beyond the due 
process requirements enunciated by the plurality, would result in the 
full due process procedures entailed in a criminal trial. Indeed, the 
citizen identified for targeted killing is more entitled to due process 
proceedings considering the finality of death compared to the 
restriction of liberty. Using Hamdi's reasoning, if a citizen that is 
deemed an enemy combatant is entitled to some form of due process 
when detained of liberty, it should follow that a citizen targeted for 
deprivation of life is also entitled to due process.103 
2. Boumediene v. Bush 
In accordance with Hamdi's mandate, the Government began 
conducting Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) to 
determine if each detainee was a threat and whether they should 
remain detained as enemy combatants.104 Following the suggestions 
proposed in Hamdi, the CSRTs entailed a presumption for 
Government evidence105 and allowed hearsay. 106 Additional 
restrictions on due process were also imposed, including denying the 
detainee access to classified information used as evidence, 107 and 
assigning the detainee a "Personal Representative. "108 However, the 
personal representatives did not act as the detainee's lawyer, nor were 
they even an advocate for the detainee. 109 
In an attempt to counteract the Hamdi ruling, Congress enacted 
the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA), which removed 
jurisdiction from federal courts for non-citizen Guantanamo detainees 
and granted the D.C. Court of Appeals exclusive jurisdiction over 
101. Id. at 590 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
102. Id. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
103. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-358 (1977) ("[T]he action of the 
sovereign in taking the life of one of its citizens . . . differs dramatically 
from any other legitimate state action"); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 
399, 411 (1986) ("[E]xecution is the most irremediable and unfathomable 
of penalties; that death is different"); O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 
151, 171 n.3 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]he unique character of 
the death penalty mandates special scrutiny of...procedures in capital 
cases"). 
104. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 733 (2008). 
105. Id. at 767. 
106. Id. at 816. 
107. Id. at 784. 
108. Id. at 767. 
109. Id. 
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CSRTs decisions.11° Subsequently, the Court limited the applicability 
of the DTA in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,111 holding that the removal of 
habeas corpus jurisdiction from federal courts for Guantanamo 
detainees did not apply to those writs pending when the DTA was 
passed.112 Congress again responded by passing the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA), providing that the DTA did apply 
retroactively to the writs at issue in Hamdan and that CSRTs were 
controlled by the DTA113 Thus, the framework in which Boumediene 
v. Bush was decided on was in place. 
Boumediene, a non-citizen, was classified as an enemy combatant 
and detained at Guantanamo Bay.114 He filed a writ of habeas corpus, 
claiming, inter alia, his detention violated the Due Process Clause.115 
The Supreme Court first held that the MCA § 7 did not deny federal 
courts jurisdiction for writs of habeas corpus from non-citizen 
detainees at Guantanamo. 116 Finding jurisdiction, the Court held 
_ CSRTs were insufficient replacements for writs of habeas corpus; 
therefore, the MCA was effectively an unconstitutional violation of 
the Suspension Clause. 117 The Court then found that the Fifth 
Amendment due process right to liberty applied to non-citizen 
Guantanamo detainees and that the detainees could challenge the 
adequacy of CSRTs before they sought writs of habeas corpus.118 
Thus, Boumediene provides that even non-citizen detainees held 
outside U.S. jurisdiction are owed some m~asure of due process 
rights. 119 The first element of importance that Boumediene holds is 
that even non-citizens outside U.S. jurisdiction are entitled to some 
measure of due process before being subject to government action. 120 
Hence, Boumediene reaffirms Reid v. Covert in holding the 
110. Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 
2739. 
111. 548 U.S. 557, 557 (2006). 
112. Id. at 57 4-76. 
113. Military Commissions Act of 2006, § 7, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 
2600, 2635-36 (codified as amended 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a-50w (2006)). 
114. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 723. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. at 795. 
117. Id; U.S. CONST. art. I, §9, cl 2. (Suspension Cl. "The Privilege of the 
Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of 
Rebellion or .Invasion the public Safety may require it."). 
118. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771. 
119. Id. 
120. Murphy & Radsan, supra note 19, at 429-37 (contending Boumediene 
subjects the Government to due-process restrictions wherever it acts in 
the world). 
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Government is subjected to the confines of the Constitution, even 
abroad. 121 Secondly, the liberty interest at stake in Boumediene is the 
entitlement to be free from unjust captivity. Undoubtedly, the 
interest to be free from unjust captivity is significant, yet as 
previously established, the interest in being free from erroneous 
deprivation of life is more significant. Furthermore, Boumediene held 
that procedural due process was due to non-citizens;122 thus, 
undoubtedly, citizens should also be afforded procedural due process 
rights. These elements from Boumediene reveal that a non-citizen 
who is outside U.S. jurisdiction is still entitled to procedural due 
process when the detainee's freedom is the liberty interest at stake.123 
Applied to drone strikes, it is a logical conclusion that a citizen 
abroad, with a more significant liberty interest with his life at stake, 
is also entitled to procedural due process before the Government 
attempts to deprive him of life in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 
C. Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Terrorists (AUMF) 
For the President to lawfully order a drone strike on a citizen, the 
authority must derive from either an act of Congress or Article II of 
the Constitution.124 As evidenced in Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, the 
Government claims legal justification from the A UMF when it 
engages in drone strikes on citizens engaged in terrorism, 125 which was 
passed in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. The A UMF 
authorized the President to use necessary and appropriate force 
against all "nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, 
authorized, committed, or aided or harbored such organizations or 
persons" to prevent future attacks against the United States.126 This 
legislation granted the President authority to conduct the war in 
Afghanistan and numerous worldwide counterterrorism operations. 
The Government has continued to offer the AUMF as justification for 
counterterrorism actions, including drone strikes; however, the AUMF 
requires a nexus to the September 11 attacks, and as time elapses the 
connection to those attacks becomes more tenuous. 127 
121. 354 U.S. 1, 6 (1957). 
122. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771. 
123. Id. 
124. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); 
Delahunty & Motz, supra note 33, at 16. 
125. 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4-5, 24 (D.D.C. 2010); Ramsden, supra note 26, at 
396. 
126. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 
224 (2001) (codified as 50 U.S.C. 1541, § 2a (2006)). 
127. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536 (stating the AUMF cannot function as "a blank 
check for the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation's 
citizens."). 
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claiming, inter alia, his detention violated the Due Process Clause.115 
The Supreme Court first held that the MCA§ 7 did not deny federal 
courts jurisdiction for writs of habeas corpus from non-citizen 
detainees at Guantanamo.116 Finding jurisdiction, the Court held 
CSRTs were insufficient replacements for writs of habeas corpus; 
therefore, the MCA was effectively an unconstitutional violation of 
the Suspension Clause. 117 The Court then found that the Fifth 
Amendment due process right to liberty applied to non-citizen 
Guantanamo detainees and that the detainees could challenge the 
adequacy of CSRTs before they sought writs of habeas corpus.118 
Thus, Boumediene provides that even non-citizen detainees held 
outside U.S. jurisdiction are owed some m~asure of due process 
rights. 119 The first element of importance that Boumediene holds is 
that even non-citizens outside U.S. jurisdiction are entitled to some 
measure of due process before being subject to government action. 120 
Hence, Boumediene reaffirms Reid v. Covert in holding the 
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the world). 
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undoubtedly, citizens should also be afforded procedural due process 
rights. These elements from Boumediene reveal that a non-citizen 
who is outside U.S. jurisdiction is still entitled to procedural due 
process when the detainee's freedom is the liberty interest at stake.123 
Applied to drone strikes, it is a logical conclusion that a citizen 
abroad, with a more significant liberty interest with his life at stake, 
is also entitled to procedural due process before the Government 
attempts to deprive him of life in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 
C. Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Terrorists (AUMF) 
For the President to lawfully order a drone strike on a citizen, the 
authority must derive from either an act of Congress or Article II of 
the Constitution.124 As evidenced in Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, the 
Government claims legal justification from the AUMF when it 
engages in drone strikes on citizens engaged in terrorism, 125 which was 
passed in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. The A UMF 
authorized the President to use necessary and appropriate force 
against all "nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, 
authorized, committed, or aided or harbored such organizations or 
persons" to prevent future attacks against the United States.126 This 
legislation granted the President authority to conduct the war in 
Afghanistan and numerous worldwide counterterrorism operations. 
The Government has continued to offer the A UMF as justification for 
counterterrorism actions, including drone strikes; however, the A UMF 
requires a nexus to the September 11 attacks, and as time elapses the 
connection to those attacks becomes more tenuous. 127 
121. 354 U.S. 1, 6 (1957). 
122. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771. 
123. Id. 
124. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); 
. Delahunty & Motz, supra note 33, at 16. 
125. 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4-5, 24 (D.D.C. 2010); Ramsden, supra note 26, at 
396. 
126. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 
224 (2001) (codified as 50 U.S.C. 1541, § 2a (2006)). 
127. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536 (stating the AUMF cannot function as "a blank 
check for the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation's 
citizens."). 
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The Al-Aulaqi scenario provides a helpful medium for 
understanding this point. In Al-A ulaqi, the Government contended 
the AUMF justified its drone strike. 128 The Government argued that 
AQAP is "either part of Al-Qaeda, or is an associated force, or 
cobelligerent, of Al-Qaeda that has directed armed attacks against the 
United States. "129 Thus, the Government claimed the AUMF justified 
the use of force against AQAP, and by extension, Al-Aulaqi. 130 
However, the Government's interpretation of the AUMF is 
untenably broad and fails to justify the use of force against AQAP. 
The A UMF was enacted in order to "prevent any future acts of . . . 
terrorism against the United States. "131 Yet, the AUMF authorizes the 
use of force only against entities that were somehow associated with 
the September 11 attacks. 132 The futility of the Government's 
connection between the AUMF and AQAP is evident by the fact that 
AQAP did not exist in the period before or immediately after the 
September 11 attacks. In fact, the Government itself states 
"AQAP's predecessor, Al-Qaeda in Yemen, came into existence .. '. 
in February 2006" and "AQAP emerged in January 2009. "133 The 
United States did not even designate AQAP a terrorist organization 
until January 2010.134 Therefore, it is difficult to imagine how AQAP 
could have "planned, authorized, committed, or aided" the September 
11 attacks without being in existence at the time. 135 
Furthermore, in Hamlily v. Obama, the D.C. District Court in 
interpreting the AUMF held that '"[a]ssociated forces' do not include 
terrorist organizations who merely share an abstract philosophy or 
even a common purpose with Al-Qaeda there must be an actual 
association in the current conflict with Al-Qaeda or the Taliban. "136 
While holding that Al-Qaeda and the Taliban clearly meets this 
standard, the Court dictated "AQAP is a separate and distinct group 
128. Al-Aulaqi, 727 F.Supp.2d at 4-5, 24; Ramsden, supra note 26, at 396. 
129. Al-Aulaqi Complaint, supra note 31, at 1. 
130. Id. at 24. 
131. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 
224 (2001), codified as 50 U.S.C. 1541, § 2a (2006). 
132. Banks & Raven-Hansen, supra note 82, at 737. 
133. Nat'l Counterterrorism Ctr., Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
{AQAP), http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/aqap,html (last visited Oct. 
27, 2011); Bruce Ackerman, Obama 's Death Panel FOREIGN PoL'Y Oct. 
7, 2011. ' ' 
134. Pub~i~ Declaration of James R. Clapper, Dir. of Nat'l Intelligence (DNI), 
Exh1b1t 1, , 13, Unclassified Declaration in Support of Formal Claim of 
State Secrets Privilege. 
135. Ackerman, supra note 133. 
136. Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F.Supp. 2d. 63, 79-80 (D.D.C. 2009). 
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that is not known to have any actual association with Al-Qaeda, 
whether in terms of command structure or activities, and no 
connection to September 11. "137 Many commentators have analogized 
Al-Qaeda to a franchise. 138 Prior to the 9/11 attacks, Al-Qaeda ':as a 
"relatively hierarchical and centralized, though geographically 
dispersed, organization that operated throu?h cells. "139 Mainl~ due to 
the war in Afghanistan and counterterronsm efforts worldwide, Al-
Qaeda has become an ideal for a loose collection of like-minded 
movements, "actring1 less through its own cells than through a 
confederacy of affiliated terrorist organization . . . that it inspires, 
leads, and supports. "140 
Moreover, Congress refused to include language in the A UMF 
that was proposed by the White House to allow the Executive to not 
only take military action against entities involved in the September 11 
attacks, but also "to deter and pre-empt any future acts of terrorism 
or aggression against the United States."141 Such language wo~ld 
have drastically increased Executive discretion to combat all potential 
terrorism and aggression, rather than limiting the scope by requiring a 
nexus to September 11.142 
The floor debates in the Senate and House on [the AUMF] make 
clear that the focus of the military force legislation was on the extent 
of the authorization that Congress would provide to the President for 
use of U:S. military force against the international terrorists who 
attacked the United States on September 11, 2001 and those who 
directly and materially assisted them in carrying out their actions. 
The language of the enacted legislation, on its face, makes clear -
especially in contrast to the White· House's draft joint resolution of 
September 12, 2001 - the degree to which Congress limited the scope 
of the President's authorization to use U.S. military force through [the 
137. Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary 
Injunction and in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Al-





Combating Al-Qaeda and the Militant Islamic Threat, Testimony 
presented to the H. Armed Serv. Comm., Subcomm. on Terrorism, 
Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, 109th Cong. 1, 3 (2006) 
(testimony of Bruce Hoffman, Rand Corp.). · 
Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressiond Authorization 
and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2109 (2005). 
Id. at 2109; Nat'l Comm'n. on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 
9111 Commission Report, 118, 55-58, 67 (2004). 
RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22357, 
AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE IN 
RESPONSE TO THE 9/11 ATTACKS (P.L. 107-40): LEG. HISTORY, 
3 (2007). 
142. Id. at 3. 
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The Al-Aulaqi scenario provides a helpful medium for 
understanding this point. In Al-Aulaqi, the Government contended 
the AUMF justified its drone strike. 128 The Government argued that 
AQAP is "either part of Al-Qaeda, or is an associated force or 
cobelligerent, of Al-Qaeda that has directed armed attacks against' the 
United States. "129 Thus, the Government claimed the A UMF justified 
the use of force against AQAP, and by extension, Al-Aulaqi.13o 
However, the Government's interpretation of the AUMF is 
untenably broad and fails to justify the use of force against AQAP. 
The A UMF was enacted in order to "prevent any future acts of . . . 
terrorism against the United States. "131 Yet, the AUMF authorizes the 
use of force only against entities that were somehow associated with 
the September 11 attacks. 132 The futility of the Government's 
connection between the AUMF and AQAP is evident by the fact that 
AQAP did not exist in the period before or immediately after the 
September 11 attacks. In fact, the Government itself states 
"AQAP's predecessor, Al-Qaeda in Yemen, came into existence .. '. 
in February 2006" and "AQAP emerged in January 2009."133 The 
United States did not even designate AQAP a terrorist organization 
until January 2010.134 Therefore, it is difficult to imagine how AQAP 
could have "planned, authorized, committed, or aided" the September 
11 attacks without being in existence at the time. 135 
Furthermore, in Hamlily v. Obama, the D.C. District Court in 
interpreting the AUMF held that '"[a]ssociated forces' do not include 
terrorist organizations who merely share an abstract philosophy or 
even a common purpose with Al-Qaeda - there must be an actual 
association in the current conflict with Al-Qaeda or the Taliban. "136 
While holding that Al-Qaeda and the Taliban clearly meets this 
standard, the Court dictated "AQAP is a separate and distinct group 
128. Al-Aulaqi, 727 F.Supp.2d at 4-5, 24; Ramsden, supra note 26, at 396. 
129. Al-Aulaqi Complaint, supra note 31, at 1. 
130. Id. at 24. 
131. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 
224 (2001), codified as 50 U.S.C. 1541, § 2a (2006). 
.132. Banks & Raven-Hansen, supra note 82, at 737. 
133. Nat'l Counterterrorism Ctr., Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
(AQAP}, http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/aqap.html (last visited Oct. 
27, 2011); Bruce Ackerman, Obama's Death Panel FOREIGN POL'Y Oct. 
7, 2011. ' ' 
134. Pub~i~ Declaration of James R. Clapper, Dir. of Nat'l Intelligence (DNI), 
Exh1b1t 1, , 13, Unclassified Declaration in Support of Formal Claim of 
State Secrets Privilege. 
135. Ackerman, supra note 133. 
136. Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F.Supp. 2d. 63, 79-80 (D.D.C. 2009). 
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that is not known to have any actual association with Al-Qaeda, 
whether in terms of command structure or activities, and no 
connection to September ll."137 Many commentators have analogized 
Al-Qaeda to a franchise. 138 Prior to the 9 /11 attacks, Al-Qaeda was a 
"relatively hierarchical and centralized, though geographically 
dispersed, organization that operated through cells. "139 Mainly due to 
the war in Afghanistan and counterterrorism efforts worldwide, Al-
Qaeda has become an ideal for a loose collection of like-minded 
movements, "actringl less through its own cells than through a 
confederacy of affiliated terrorist organization ... that it inspires, 
leads, and supports. "140 
Moreover, Congress refused to include language in the A UMF 
that was proposed by the White House to allow the Executive to not 
only take military action against entities involved in the September 11 
attacks, but also "to deter and pre-empt any future acts of terrorism 
or aggression against the United States. "141 Such language wo1:1d 
have drastically increased Executive discretion to combat all potential 
terrorism and aggression, rather than limiting the scope by requiring a 
nexus to September 11.142 
The floor debates in the Senate and House on [the A UMF] make 
clear that the focus of the military force legislation was on the extent 
of the authorization that Congress would provide to the President for 
use of U:S. military force against the international terrorists who 
attacked the United States on September 11, 2001 and those who 
directly and materially assisted them in carrying out their actions. 
The language of the enacted legislation, on its face, makes clear -
especially in contrast to the White· House's draft joint resolution of 
September 12, 2001 - the degree to which Congress limited the scope 
of the President's authorization to use U.S. military force through [the 
137. Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary 
Injunction and in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Al-





Combating Al-Qaeda and the Militant Islamic Threat, Testimony 
presented to the H. Armed Serv. Comm., Subcomm. on Terrorism, 
Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, 109th Cong. 1, 3 (2006) 
(testimony of Bruce Hoffman, Rand Corp.). · 
Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressionaz Authorization 
and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2109 (2005). 
Id. at 2109; Nat'l Cornm'n. on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 
9111 Commission Report, 118, 55-58, 67 (2004). 
RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22357, 
AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE IN 
RESPONSE TO THE 9/11 ATTACKS (P.L. 107-40): LEG. HISTORY, 
3 (2007). 
142. Id. at 3. 
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AUMFJ to military actions against only those international terrorists 
and other parties directly involved in aiding or materially supporting 
the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States. The 
authorization was not framed in terms of use of military action 
against terrorists generally. i43 
The r~sul~ .is t~at, as time passes, the AUMF is less likely to offer 
adequate JUst1ficat10n for counterterrorism action. "[It is] increasingly 
tough to say that [the AUMFJ authorizes the United States' co~~inuing activities ... given America's recent decimation of the 
ongmal Al-Qaeda's fighting capacity. "i44 Yet the Government 
~ontinues to rel~ on the A UMF as justification, erroneously as argued 
m the Al-Aulaq1 context, thus necessitating the need to institute due 
. pr~;ess protections. As stated in Hamdi, the AUMF cannot function 
as a blank check for the President when it comes to the rights of the 
Nation's citizens. "i45 
Eve~ if the AUMF was found to grant the Executive authority to 
en~age m the .dro~e strikes discussed, the judiciary has the power to rev1e~ determmat.10n~ .made by the Executive for targeted killings. i46 
Specifically, the Judiciary has the "ability to review whether the 
ex~cuti~e ~as properly identified specific individuals or objects as 
bemg withm the scope of congressionally authorized hostilities. ni41 The Supr~me Court has previously instituted judicial review on the scope 
and ~nte~t of the AUMF in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,i4s stating "there is 
nothmg I~ the AUMF's text or legislative history even hinting that 
Congress mtended to expand or alter the authorization set forth. ni49 





Ackerman, supra note 133. 
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536. 
John Dehn & Kevin Heller, Targeted Killing: The Case of Anwar al-
Aulaqi, 1?9 U. PA .. L. REV. 175, 178 (2011) ("The jurisdiction of federal 
courts exists to review executive war measures in appropriate cases."). 
Id. at 178-179 (citing The Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat) 546 557-
58 (18~8)) (s~at~ng. t~at '.'[t]he Supreme Court found that general ~ants 
of admiralty JUnsd1ct10n mcluded the power to review maritime captures 
?f .su~p~cted enemy ships and property."). Grants of habeas corpus JU~~sd1ct10n have also permitted judicial review of some detentions and 
military ~o~missions, see Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); Ex 
Parte Qumn, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); Ex Parte Milligan 71 US (4 Wall) 2 (1866)). ' . . . 
148. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 559 (2006). 
149. Id. 
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III. PROPOSED LEGAL SOLUTION 
To review, Reid holds that the protections of the Constitution 
remain with citizens when they are abroad.i5o The previous discussion 
of the Mathews balancing test shows that the factors point to 
providing a procedural due process right to citizens engaged in 
terrorist activities outside the United Statesi5i As Hamdi makes clear, 
a U.S. citizen engaged in terrorist activities is entitled to due process 
rights; however, not the due process protections that equate to a full 
trial. i52 In addition, the B oumediene Court held that detainees 
outside the United States are entitled to habeas corpus relief in 
federal courts.i53 Accordingly, citizens are entitled to procedural due 
process before the Government subjects them to drone strikes. It is 
imperative the Government adhere to these constitutional 
requirements before taking the momentous choice to kill a citizen. 
The challenge is to formulate a procedure that will protect the due 
process rights of such citizens while allowing the discretion the 
Executive needs to maintain national security. i54 The touchstone of 
procedural due process is "a search for what procedures are fair under 
the circumstances of each particular case. "i55 
This Note proposes legislation, under Article III, i56 to provide the 
Federal Judiciary with ex ante judicial review before the Government 
can target a citizen for a drone strike. The hearing, similar to a 
warrant proceeding, would require the Government to prove to the 
D.C. Circuit Court or a newly created court, similar to the FISA 
150. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 6 (1957). 
151. See supra Part II (A). 
152. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004). 
153. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008). 
154. Murphy & Radsan, supra note 19, at 422-23 ("The difficulty is to 
develop a balance between strict limitations that protects citizens' due 
process rights and absolute discretion to the Executive branch to protect 
the nation from additional attacks."). 
155. Gary Lawson, Katharine Ferguson, & Guillermo A. Montero, "Oh Lord, 
Please Don't Let Me Be Misunderstood!" Rediscovering the Mathews v. 
Eldridge and Penn Central Frameworks, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 14 
(2005) (the fundamental premise of procedural due process is "a search 
for what procedures are fair under the circumstances of each particular 
case."); Loftier Standards for the CIA 's Remote-Control Killing, Before 
the H. Subcomm. on Nat'l Sec. & Foreign Affairs 1, at 9 (2010) 
(Statement of Afsheen John Radsan, Professor of Law, Wm. Mitchell 
College of Law). 
156. U.S. CONST. Art. I, Sec. 3; (Congress has the power '![t]o constitute 
Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court" and Congress has the power to 
"ordain and establish" "such inferior courts."). 
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A UMFJ to military actions against only those international terrorists 
and other parties directly involved in aiding or materially supporting 
the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States. The 
authorization was not framed in terms of use of military action 
against terrorists generally.143 
The result is that, as time passes, the A UMF is less likely to offer 
adequate justification for counterterrorism action. "[It is] increasingly 
tough to say that [the AUMF] authorizes the United States' 
continuing activities ... given America's recent decimation of the 
original Al-Qaeda's fighting capacity. "144 Yet the Government 
~ontinues to rel~ on the A UMF as justification, erroneously as argued 
m the Al-Aulaq1 context, thus necessitating the need to institute due 
. pr~~ess protections. As stated in Hamdi, the AUMF cannot function 
as a blank check for the President when it comes to the rights of the 
Nation's citizens. "145 
Eve~ if the AUMF was found to grant the Executive authority to 
en~age m the .drone strikes discussed, the judiciary has the power to 
revie~ determmations made by the Executive for targeted killings.145 
Specifically, the judiciary has the "ability to review whether the 
ex~cuti~e ~as properly identified specific individuals or objects as 
bemg withm the scope of congressionally authorized hostilities. "147 The Supr~me Court has previously instituted judicial review on the scope 
and ~nte~t of the AUMF in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 148 stating "there is 
nothmg ii: the AUMF's text or legislative history even hinting that 
Congress mtended to expand or alter the authorization set forth. "149 
143. Id. at 4. 
144. Ackerman, supra note 133. 
145. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536. 
146. John ?ehn & Kevin Heller, Targeted Killing: The Case of Anwar al-
A ulaqz, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 175, 178 (2011) ("The jurisdiction of federal 
courts exists to review executive war measures in appropriate cases."). 
147. Id. at 178-179 (citing The Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat) 546 557-
58 (18~8)) (s~at~ng. t~at '.'[t]he Supreme Court found that general ~ants 
of admiralty Junsd1ct10n mcluded the power to review maritime captures 
?f .su~p~cted enemy ships and property."). Grants of habeas corpus 
Junsd1ct10n have also permitted judicial review of some detentions and 
military commissions, see Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); Ex 
Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); Ex Parte Milligan 71 U.S. (4 Wall) 2 (1866)). ' . 
148. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 559 (2006). 
149. Id. 
150 
JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY& THE INTERNET· VOL. 4 ·No. l · 2012 
Drone Strikes on Citizens 
III. PROPOSED LEGAL SOLUTION 
To review, Reid holds that the protections of the Constitution 
remain with citizens when they are abroad. 150 The previous discussion 
of the Ma thews balancing test shows that the factors point to 
providing a procedural due process right to citizens engaged in 
terrorist activities outside the United States151 As Hamdi makes clear, 
a U.S. citizen engaged in terrorist activities is entitled to due process 
rights; however, not the due process protections that equate to a full 
trial.152 In addition, the Boumediene Court held that detainees 
outside the United States are entitled to habeas corpus relief in 
federal courts.153 Accordingly, citizens are entitled to procedural due 
process before the Government subjects them to drone strikes. It is 
imperative the Government adhere to these constitutional 
requirements before taking the momentous choice to kill a citizen. 
The challenge is to formulate a procedure that will protect the due 
process rights of such citizens while allowing the discretion the 
Executive needs to maintain national security.154 The touchstone of 
procedural due process is "a search for what procedures are fair under 
the circumstances of each particular case. "155 
This Note proposes legislation, under Article III, 156 to provide the 
Federal Judiciary with ex ante judicial review before the Government 
can target a citizen for a drone strike. The hearing, similar to a 
warrant proceeding, would require the Government to prove to the 
D.C. Circuit Court or a newly created court, similar to the FISA 
150. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 6 (1957). 
151. See supra Part II (A). 
152. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004). 
153. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008). 
154. Murphy & Radsan, supra note 19, at 422-23 ("The difficulty is to 
develop a balance between strict limitations that protects citizens' due 
process rights and absolute discretion to the Executive branch to protect 
the nation from additional attacks."). 
155. Gary Lawson, Katharine Ferguson, & Guillermo A. Montero, "Oh Lord, 
Please Don't Let Me Be Misunderstood!" Rediscovering the Mathews v. 
Eldridge and Penn Central Frameworks, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 14 
(2005) (the fundamental premise of procedural due process is "a search 
for what procedures are fair under the circumstances of each particular 
case."); Loftier Standards for the CIA 's Remote-Control Killing, Before 
the H. Subcomm. on Nat'l Sec. & Foreign Affairs 1, at 9 (2010) 
(Statement of Afsheen John Radsan, Professor of Law, Wm. Mitchell 
College of Law). 
156. U.S. CONST. Art. I, Sec. 3; (Congress has the power '~[t]o constitute 
Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court" and Congress has the power to 
"ordain and establish" "such inferior courts."). 
151 
JouRNALOFLAw, TECHNOLOGY&THEINTERNET · VoL.4 ·No. l · 2012 
Drone Strikes on Citizens 
Court, 157 that adequate justification exists for conducting a drone 
strike on a citizen allegedly engaged in terrorist activities. Such a 
proceeding allows for protection of the citizen's due process rights, 
limits unfettered Executive discretion to kill citizens without legal 
justification and provides considerations to ensure national security. 
Congress has previously created specialized jurisdiction courts 
under Article III, such as District Bankruptcy Courts, the Court of 
International Trade, and the FISA Court.158 In recent years, there 
has been a plethora of advocates for the creation of an Article III 
court capable of handing the unique challenges trying a terror suspect 
would present; these proposals are commonly called 'National Security 
Courts' or 'Domestic Terror Courts. '159 Other ideas propose trying 
suspected terrorists in the FISA Court. 16° Commenting on the 
proposals for a National Security Court, former U.S. Attorney 
General Mukasey agreed that the proposals need to be taken seriously 
by Congress subject to its Article III power to establish inferior 
courts. 161 
A. Legal Elements 
The Government must prove the elements listed below beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 162 "Beyond a reasonable doubt" is the appropriate 
157. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §§1801-62 (2006). 
Specifically, § 1803 provides for the establishment of FISA courts: "[t]he 
Chief Justice of the United States shall publicly designate 11 district 
court judges ... :who shall constitute a court." Id. § 1803(a)(l). 
158. Kevin E. Lunday & Harvey Rishikof, Due Process is a Strategic Choice: 
Legitimacy and the Establishment of an Article III National Security 
Court, 39 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 87, 111 n. 87 (2008) (discussing the history 
of Congress creating District Bankruptcy Courts and the Court of 
International Trade before establishing the FISA Court). 
159. Jack Goldsmith & Neal Katyal, The Terrorists' Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 
11, 2007, at A19; Guiora, supra note 28, at 834-35 (Recommending 
amendment of the FISA to allow prosecution of terrorists before the 
FISA Court, to ensure civilian control while respecting security); Amos 
N. Guiora, Quirin to Hamdan: Creating a Hybrid Paradigm for the 
Detention of Terrorists, 19 FLA. J. INT'L L. 2 (2008); Andrew C. 
McCarthy & Alykhan Velshi, We Need a National Security Court 
(unpublished White Paper submitted to Am. Enter. Inst.), available at 
http://www.defenddemocracy.org/research_topics/research_topics_sho 
w.htm?doc_id=510024. 
160. Amos N. Guiora, Military Commissions and National Security Courts 
After Guantanamo, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 199, 204 (2008). 
161. Michael Mukasey, Jose Padilla Makes Bad Law, WALL ST. J. Aug. 22, 
2007, at Al5. 
162. For discussion on standards of proof in similar scenarios, see Lunday & 
Rishikof, supra note 158, at 121 (advocating for beyond a reasonable 
doubt as the standard of proof in trials of alleged terrorists in a 
proposed National Security Court); see also Loftier Standards for the 
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standard because a drone strike will likely result in the death of the 
citizen and the proposed hearing does not provide typical procedural 
safeguards to innocence, such as adversarial proceedings.163 Most of 
the legal elements are based, in part, on accounts of the secret Obama 
Administration legal memorandum created to justify the Al-Aulaqi 
drone strike. 164 In a recent speech, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder 
provided elaboration on some of the legal reasoning in the 
memorandum. 165 
First, the suspected terrorist must pose an imminent and lethal or 
substantial threat to the United States, U.S. citizens in any part of 
the world, the U.S. military, or any other entity the Government 
shows is sufficient to protect. Holder stated that for the Government 
to engage in a targeted killing of a U.S. citizen, the citizen must pose 
"an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States. "166 
Second, the killing must be necessary. The Government must 
show that lesser actions like freezing of assets, enhanced security, or 
other counterterrorism actions are insufficient measures to protect the 
United States, U.S. citizens in any part of the world, the U.S. 
military, or any other entity the Government shows is sufficient to 
protect.167 
Third there must be considerable difficulty in capturing the 
suspected' terrorist, including a foreign government denying U.S. 
authorities or military access to the country in which terrorist is 
located, considerable danger to the U.S. authorities or military that 
would be engaged in capture operation, or any other considerable 
difficulty deemed prohibitive. 168 Indeed, the Obama Administration 
memorandum reportedly argues the Al-Aulaqi drone strike would only 
have been legal if the Government was not able to secure his 
CIA 's Remote-Control Killing, Before the H. Subcomm. on Nat'l Sec. & 
Foreign Affairs 1, at 4 (2010) (Statement of Afsheen John Radsan, 
Professor of Law, Wm. Mitchell College of Law); John Radsan Afsheen 
& Richard Murphy, Measure Twice, Shoot Once: Higher Care for CIA 
Targeted Killing, 4 U. ILL. L, REV. 1201, 1224 (2011). 
163. See Radsan & Murphy, supra note 162, at 1224. ("Drone strikes ... are 
executions without any appeals in court."). 
164. Charles Savage, Secret U.S. Memo Made Legal Case to Kill a Citizen, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2011, at Al. 
165. Eric Holder, U.S. Att'y Gen., Speech at Nw. U. Sch. of Law (Mar. 5, 
2012). 
166. Id. 
167. See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2010); Savage, 
supra note 164, at Al (claiming the secret Executive branch memo holds 
that it would only have been legal to kill Al-Aulaqi if capture or lesser 
means were determined to be incapable). 
168. Savage, supra note 164; Holder, supra note 165. 
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Court,157 that adequate justification exists for conducting a drone 
strike on a citizen allegedly engaged in terrorist activities. Such a 
proceeding allows for protection of the citizen's due process rights, 
limits unfettered Executive discretion to kill citizens without legal 
justification and provides considerations to ensure national security. 
Congress has previously created specialized jurisdiction courts 
under Article III, such as District Bankruptcy Courts, the Court of 
International Trade, and the FISA Court. 158 In recent years, there 
has been a plethora of advocates for the creation of an Article III 
court capable of handing the unique challenges trying a terror suspect 
would present; these proposals are commonly called 'National Security 
Courts' or 'Domestic Terror Courts. n 59 Other ideas propose trying 
suspected terrorists in the FISA Court. 16° Commenting on the 
proposals for a National Security Court, former U.S. Attorney 
General Mukasey agreed that the proposals need to be taken seriously 
by Congress subject to its Article III power to establish inferior 
courts. 161 
A. Legal Elements 
The Government must prove the elements listed below beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 162 "Beyond a reasonable doubt" is the appropriate 
157. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §§1801-62 (2006). 
Specifically, § 1803 provides for the establishment of FISA courts: "[t]he 
Chief Justice of the United States shall publicly designate 11 district 
court judges ... :who shall constitute a court." Id. § 1803(a)(l). 
158. Kevin E. Lunday & Harvey Rishikof, Due Process is a Strategic Choice: 
Legitimacy and the Establishment of an Article III National Security 
Court, 39 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 87, 111 n. 87 (2008) (discussing the history 
of Congress creating District Bankruptcy Courts and the Court of 
International Trade before establishing the FISA Court). 
159. Jack Goldsmith & Neal Katyal, The Terrorists' Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 
11, 2007, at A19; Guiora, supra note 28, at 834-35 (Recommending 
amendment of the FISA to allow prosecution of terrorists before the 
FISA Court, to ensure civilian control while respecting security); Amos 
N. Guiora, Quirin to Hamdan: Creating a Hybrid Paradigm for the 
Detention of Terrorists, 19 FLA. J. INT'L L. 2 (2008); Andrew C. 
McCarthy & Alykhan Velshi, We Need a National Security Court 
(unpublished White Paper submitted to Am. Enter. Inst.), available at 
http://www.defenddemocracy.org/research_topics/research_topics_sho 
w.htm?doc_id=510024. 
160. Amos N. Guiora, Military Commissions and National Security Courts 
After Guantanamo, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 199, 204 (2008). 
161. Michael Mukasey, Jose Padilla Makes Bad Law, WALL ST. J. Aug. 22, 
2007, at Al5. 
162. For discussion on standards of proof in similar scenarios, see Lunday & 
Rishikof, supra note 158, at 121 (advocating for beyond a reasonable 
doubt as the standard of proof in trials of alleged terrorists in a 
proposed National Security Court); see also Loftier Standards for the 
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standard because a drone strike will likely result in the death of the 
citizen and the proposed hearing does not provide typical procedural 
safeguards to innocence, such as adversarial proceedings.163 Most of 
the legal elements are based, in part, on accounts of the secret Obam~ 
Administration legal memorandum created to justify the Al-Aulaq1 
drone strike. 164 In a recent speech, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder 
provided elaboration on some of the legal reasoning in the 
memorandum.165 
First, the suspected terrorist must pose an imminent and lethal or 
substantial threat to the United States, U.S. citizens in any part of 
the world, the U.S. military, or any other entity the Government 
shows is sufficient to protect. Holder stated that for the Government 
to engage in a targeted killing of a U.S. citizen, the citizen must pose 
"an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States."166 
Second the killing must be necessary. The Government must 
show that lesser actions like freezing of assets, enhanced security, or 
other counterterrorism actions are insufficient measures to protect the 
United States, U.S. citizens in any part of the world, the U.S. 
military, or any other entity the Government shows is sufficient to 
protect. 167 
Third there must be considerable difficulty in capturing the 
suspected' terrorist, including a foreign government denying U.S. 
authorities or military access to the country in which terrorist is 
located considerable danger to the U.S. authorities or military that 
would be engaged in capture operation, or any other considerable 
difficulty deemed prohibitive. 168 Indeed, the Obama Administration 
memorandum reportedly argues the Al-Aulaqi drone strike would only 
have been legal if the Government was not able to secure his 
CIA 's Remote-Control Killing, Before the H. Subcomm. on Nat'l Sec. & 
Foreign Affairs 1, at 4 (2010) (Statement of Afsheen John Radsan, 
Professor of Law, Wm. Mitchell College of Law); John Radsan Afsheen 
& Richard Murphy, Measure Twice, Shoot Once: Higher Care for CIA 
Targeted Killing, 4 U. ILL. L; REV. 1201, 1224 (2011). 
163. See Radsan & Murphy, supra note 162, at 1224. ("Drone strikes ... are 
executions without any appeals in court."). 
164. Charles Savage, Secret U.S. Memo Made Legal Case to Kill a Citizen, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2011, at Al. 





See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2010); Savage, 
supra note 164, at Al (claiming the secret Executive branch memo holds 
that it would only have been legal to kill Al-Aulaqi if capture or lesser 
means were determined to be incapable). 
Savage, supra note 164; Holder, supra note 165. 
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capture.169 Furthermore, Holder pronounced, "[i]t is preferable to 
capture suspected terrorists where feasible. "170 The Government must 
also pledge to take reasonable and appropriate measures to avoid 
killing or harming innocent persons and collateral damage when 
conducting the drone strike. 171 
B. Designated Judicial Forum 
The appropriate forum for such a proceeding offers considerable 
difficulties. Judicial approval for a targeted killing, unlike a warrant, 
does not provide the full safeguards of an adversarial proceeding. 
Once judicial approval is granted, the citizen is subject to lethal force 
by the Government. Therefore, such a determination is of much 
greater weight than a warrant proceeding and thus requires enhanced 
scrutiny,172 for "the action of the sovereign in taking the life of one of 
its citizens . . . differs dramatically from any other legitimate state 
action. "173 
The judiciary, as opposed to Congress, is a more appropriate 
forum for such a. hearing. Congress is inherently political, and political 
pressures would likely supersede evidence in decisions. A Member 
likely may base a decision on a number of issues, such as political 
p~pularity, _special interests, or ideology, rather than on facts. "[The 
Bill of Attamer Clause, Art. I, §9, cl. 3,J and the separation of powers 
doctrine generally, reflect the Framers' concern that trial by a 
legislature lacks the safeguards necessary to prevent the abuse of 
power. "174 In addition, Congress lacks the expertise and skills that 
such a legal hearing would necessitate. 
The D.C. Circuit Court is the appropriate forum for such a 
hearing. A Circuit Court offers the benefit of not only of multiple 
judges, but also the likelihood of more distinguished judges capable of 
making sound decisions. Following such reasoning, it may seem that 
169. Savage, supra note 164. 
170. Holder, supra note 165. 
171. Id. ("[O]peration[s] would be conducted in a manner consistent with 
applicable law of war principles." (These principles include: 
proportionality, (collateral damage must be in relation with military 
advantage gained) and distinction of targets (only combatants or 
civilians directly engaging in hostilities may be targeted)). 
172.' Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411 (1986) ("execution is the most 
ir~emediable and unfathomable of penalties; that death is different"); 
0 Dell, 521 U.S. at 171 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]he unique 
character of the death penalty mandates special scrutiny of those 
procedures in capital cases."). 
173. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-358 (1977). 
174. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 962 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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the Supreme Court would be the optimal forum for such a hearing. 
However, the Supreme Court is subjected to much more intense 
public scrutiny and considerably more political pressure than lower 
courts. Such a proceeding in the Supreme Court would lead to a 
media circus and demands for open proceedings. Furthermore, the 
Supreme Court functions in a limited capacity, in which additional 
inquiries may be burdensome to the established docket. Still, the 
cognizable downside of employing a Circuit Court is that the judges 
typically deal with issues of law, not typically with issues of fa.ct, _as 
district judges do. However, circuit judges typically have d1stnct 
court experience where they would have been exposed to issues of 
fact. 
A second forum alternative is the creation of a federal court 
similar to the FISC Court,175 which grants requests for surveillance 
warrants against susp~cted foreign intelligence agents in the United 
States.176 The FISA Court offers a template to develop a judicial 
forum that can adequately balance a citizen's due process rights 
against national security demands in the context of handling classified 
information and time-sensitive demands. 177 The FISA Court model 
also provides numerous implementations that would be helpful to the 
proposed proceeding. 178 First, FISA Court proceedings are closed to 
the public due to the classified information and sensitive intelligence 
at issue179 (although, as discussed below, closed proceedings may not 
al~ays be necessary.) 180 Additionally, there is a procedure to allow for 
the publication of FISA Court proceedings.181 Furthermore, FISA 
Court judges have developed expertise in deciding sensitive issues 
relating to national security182 , and it is likely that judges in a FISA-
type Court would develop the same expertise in their subject matter. 
Yet there must be alterations from the FISA Court model. FISA 
' Court hearings only provide for Government lawyers who are seeking 
175. McKelvey, supra note 51, at 1378. 
176. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-62 (2006). 
177. McKelvey, supra note 51, at 1378. 
178. Guiora, supra note 28, at 834-35. 
179. Ellen Yaroshefsky, Secret Evidence Is Slowly Eroding the Adversary 
System: GIP A and FISA in the Courts, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1063, 1081 
(2006). . 
180. See infra Part III (C). 
181. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-62, Ct. Rule 
5(c) (2006). (However, only one FISA Court opi~ion has ever b~en 
approved for publication: In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611 (U.S. Foreign Intell. 
Surveil. Ct. 2002)). 
182. McKelvey, supra note 51, at 1378. 
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capture. 169 Furthermore, Holder pronounced, "[i]t is preferable to 
capture suspected terrorists where feasible. "170 The Government must 
also pledge to take reasonable and appropriate measures to avoid 
killing or harming innocent persons and collateral damage when 
conducting the drone strike. 171 
B. Designated Judicial Forum 
The appropriate forum for such a proceeding offers considerable 
difficulties. Judicial approval for a targeted killing, unlike a warrant, 
does not provide the full safeguards of an adversarial proceeding. 
Once judicial approval is granted, the citizen is subject to lethal force 
by the Government. Therefore, such a determination is of much 
greater weight than a warrant proceeding and thus requires enhanced 
scrutiny,172 for "the action of the sovereign in taking the life of one of 
its citizens . . . differs dramatically from any other legitimate state 
action. "173 
The judiciary, as opposed to Congress, is a more appropriate 
forum for such a. hearing. Congress is inherently political, and political 
pressures would likely supersede evidence in decisions. A Member 
likely may base a decision on a number of issues, such as political 
p~pularity, _special interests, or ideology, rather than on facts. "[The 
Bill of Attamer Clause, Art. I, §9, cl. 3,] and the separation of powers 
doctrine generally, reflect the Framers' concern that trial by a 
legislature lacks the safeguards necessary to prevent the abuse of 
power. "174 In addition, Congress lacks the expertise and skills that 
such a legal hearing would necessitate. 
The D.C. Circuit Court is the appropriate forum for such a 
hearing. A Circuit Court offers the benefit of not only of multiple 
judges, but also the likelihood of more distinguished judges capable of 
making sound decisions. Following such reasoning, it may seem that 
169. Savage, supra note 164. 
170. Holder, supra note 165. 
171. Id. (" [O]peration[s] would be conducted in a manner consistent with 
applicable law of war principles." (These principles include: 
proportionality, (collateral damage must be in relation with military 
advantage gained) and distinction of targets (only combatants or 
civilians directly engaging in hostilities may be targeted)). 
172: Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411 (1986) ("execution is the most 
irremediable and unfathomable of penalties· that death is different'')-
O'Dell, 521 U.S. at 171 n.3 (Stevens, J., 'dissenting) ("[T]he uniqu~ 
character of the death penalty mandates special scrutiny of those 
procedures in capital cases."). 
173. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-358 (1977). 
174. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 962 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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the Supreme Court would be the optimal forum for such a hearing. 
However, the Supreme Court is subjected to much more intense 
public scrutiny and considerably more political pressure than lower 
courts. Such a proceeding in the Supreme Court would lead to a 
media circus and demands for open proceedings. Furthermore, the 
Supreme Court functions in a limited capacity, in which additional 
inquiries may be burdensome to the established docket. Still, the 
cognizable downside of employing a Circuit Court is that the judges 
typically deal with issues of law, not typically with issues of fact, as 
district judges do. However, circuit judges typically have district 
court experience where they would have been exposed to issues of 
fact. 
A second forum alternative is the creation of a federal court 
similar to the FISC Court,175 which grants requests for surveillance 
warrants against susp~cted foreign intelligence agents in the United 
States.176 The FISA Court offers a template to develop a judicial 
forum that can adequately balance a citizen's due process rights 
against national security demands in the context of handling classified 
information and time-sensitive demands. 177 The FISA Court model 
also provides numerous implementations that would be helpful to the 
proposed proceeding. 178 First, FISA Court proceedings are closed to 
the public due to the classified information and sensitive intelligence 
at issue179 (although, as discussed below, closed proceedings may not 
al~ays be necessary. )180 Additionally, there is a procedure to allow for 
the publication of FISA Court proceedings.181 Furthermore, FISA 
Court judges have developed expertise in deciding sensitive issues 
relating to national security182 , and it is likely that judges in a FISA-
type Court would develop the same expertise in their subject matter. 
Yet there must be alterations from the FISA Court model. FISA 
' Court hearings only provide for Government lawyers who are seeking 
175. McKelvey, supra note 51, at 1378. 
176. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ l801-62 (2006). 
177. McKelvey, supra note 51, at 1378. 
178. Guiora, supra note 28, at 834-35. 
179. Ellen Yaroshefsky, Secret Evidence Is Slowly Eroding the Adversary 
System: CIPA and FISA in the Courts, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1063, 1081 
(2006). . 
180. See infra Part III (C). 
181. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-62, Ct. Rule 
5(c) (2006). (However, only one FISA Court opinion has ever been 
approved for publication: In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611 (U.S. Foreign Intel!. 
Surveil. Ct. 2002)). 
182. McKelvey, supra note 51, at 1378. 
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to gain permission to conduct intelligence gathering.183 Thus, there is 
no opposing party arguing against the Government. In the proposed 
hearmg, the stakes are significantly higher; after all, the Government 
is seeking permission to kill a citizen. Therefore, it is a necessity that 
the alleged terrorists have some type of advocate during the 
proceeding to provide an adversarial setting. 184 Because the evidence 
at issue will contain significant amounts of classified material the 
advocate arguing against the drone strike cannot be a typical private 
defen~e lawyer. A federal public defender that has been granted 
security clearance should be the advocate for the citizen. 185 In 
addit~on, a wide array of court personnel would need pre-approved 
security clearances, including judges, Government advocates, and 
court staff. 186 
C. Government Option for Secret Proceedings 
. An ~dditional safeguard that may be necessitated is secrecy of the 
proceeding. A common refrain is the need for courts trying terror 
suspects to have the ability to protect military intelligence and 
classified information, 187 and arguments exist that suggest the failures 
of current military tribunals in trying terrorists lies in the inability to 
protect intelligence.188 The Bush Administration deemed typical 
183. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-62 (2006). 
184. Yaroshe~sky, supra note 179, at 1066 (describing the fundamental 
assumption of adversarial proceedings in Article III of the Constitution). 
185. See ~ilitary Or~~r of N?v. 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of 
Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 
57,~~3, 52,834-35 (Nov. 16, 2001) {granting the Secretary of Defense the 
dec1s1on on whether counsel for detainees would be appointed or chosen. 
The Secretary chose appointed counsel). 
186. Lunda~ & Rishikof, supra note 158, at 111; Gregory S. McNeal, Beyond 
Guantanamo, Obstacles and Options 103 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 29 
(2008) (citing a confidential Interview with a senior Dept. of Justice 
Nat'! Sec. Div. official in. Cleveland, Ohio (Jul. 13, 2007)) (~ 
considerable bar to transferrmg Guantanamo detainees to Article III 
courts is the Government would not. able to provide enough prosecutors 
with security clearance). 
187. Improving Detainee Policy: Handling Terrorism Detainees within the 
American Justice System, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2008) (testimony of Amos N. Guiora Professor 
of Law, University of Utah School of Law)· Guiora supra n~te 160 at 
203 (2008). ' ' ' 
188. McNeal, supra note 186, at 29 (noting what he calls the "non-
prosecution p_ara~ox" suggests the failure of the current system to try 
alleged terrorists is due to an inability to protect intelligence.); Guiora, 
supra note 28, at 806 (2011); Guiora, supra note 160, at 203. 
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Article III courts unsuitable for suspected terrorists, 189 in part because 
of the challenges presented by presenting classified information as 
evidence. It is certain that the proposed proceedings will present 
information, sources, or methods the Government wishes to keep 
classified. 190 Specifically, there may be instances where the 
Government does not wish to broadcast to a suspected terrorist that 
he is being targeted. For instance, there are accounts that Osama bin 
Laden first learned the Government was on his trail based on 
information the Government was required to make public during a 
terrorism trial. 191 
However, the secrecy of the proceedings should be at the 
Government's discretion. In cases of high profile terrorists, the 
Government may wish to make a public case, detailing legal 
justifications, thus removing the need for closed proceedings, or 
allowing a portion of the proceedings to be open. Furthermore, 
opening certain proceedings or portions of proceedings would increase 
public confidence in the hearings. 
D. Government Option for Immediacy of Proceedings 
Military necessity often requires operations be completed 
extremely quickly, sometimes based on actionable intelligence. It is 
likely the Government would seek judicial approval for a targeted 
killing prior to the need for such a strike, likely when sufficient 
intelligence supports approval. However, there may be an instance 
when judicial approval for a drone strike is needed immediately. In 
such circumstances, national security provides an appropriate 
justification for expedited access to the judicial system, including 
leapfrogging other cases on the docket and emergency hearings. For 
example, FISA requires that a judge be on call no matter the time of 
day, and on weekends and holidays,192 and requires judges to live 
189. Dep't of Justice Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While Def~n?ing 
Against Terrorism: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
107th Cong., at 11, 17, 22 (2001) (statement of William P. Barr, 
Former. Att'y Gen. of the United States); see also Guiora, supra note 28 
at 817 (describing the trial of terror suspect Zacarias Moussaoui in an 
Article III court as a "circus"). 
190. Rosen, supra note 4, at 5292-93; Murphy & Radsan, supra note 19, at 
443· George D. Brown, Accountability, Liability, and the War on 
Te/.ror - Constitutional Tort Suits as Truth and Reconciliation Vehicles, 
63 FLA. L. REV. 193, 212 (2011); McNeal, supra note 186, at 29; Guiora, 
supra note 28, at 806. 
191. Michael B. Mukasey, U.S. Att'y Gen., Remarks Prepared for Delivery at 
the Am. Enter. Inst. for Pub. Policy Research (July 21, 2008), available 
athttp://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2008/ag-speech-0807213.html. 
192. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-62, §1803(a) 
(2006). 
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to gain permission to conduct intelligence gathering.183 Thus, there is 
no o?posing party arguing against the Government. In the proposed 
~earmg, the stakes are significantly higher; after all, the Government 
is seeking permission to kill a citizen. Therefore, it is a necessity that 
the all~ged terro~ists have some type of advocate during the 
proceedmg to provide an adversarial setting.184 Because the evidence 
at issue will contain significant amounts of classified material the 
advocate arguing against the drone strike cannot be a typical prfvate 
defense lawyer. A federal public defender that has been granted 
security clearance should be the advocate for the citizen. 185 In 
addit~on, a wide array of court personnel would need pre-approved 
security clearances, including judges, Government advocates, and 
court staff. 186 
C. Government Option for Secret Proceedings 
. An ~dditional safeguard that may be necessitated is secrecy of the 
proceeding. A common refrain is the need for courts trying terror 
susp~~ts ~o have the ability to protect military intelligence and 
classified mformation, 187 and arguments exist that suggest the failures 
of current military tribunals in trying terrorists lies in the inability to 






Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-62 (2006). 
Y aroshe~sky, supra note 179, at 1066 (describing the fundamental 
assumption of adversarial proceedings in Article III of the Constitution). 
See ~ilitary Or~~r of N?v. 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of 
Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,~~3, 52,834-35 (Nov. 16, 2001) {granting the Secretary of Defense the 
dec1s1on on whether counsel for detainees would be appointed or chosen. 
The Secretary chose appointed counsel). 
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cons1de.rable bar to transferrmg Guantanamo detainees to Article III 
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with security clearance). 
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Judiciary, l.09th. Cong. (2008) (testimony of Amos N. Guiora, Professor 
of Law, Umvers1ty of Utah School of Law)· Guiora sunra note 160 at 
203 (2008). ' ' './:' ' 
188. McNeal, supra note 186, at 29 (noting what he calls the ".non-
prosecution p.ara~ox" suggests the failure of the current system to try 
alleged terrorists is due to an inability to protect intelligence.); Guiora, 
supra note 28, at 806 (2011); Guiora, supra note 160, at 203. 
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Article III courts unsuitable for suspected terrorists, 189 in part b~cause 
f the challenges presented by presenting classified informat10n as ~vidence. It is certain that the proposed proceedings will present 
information, sources, or methods the Government wishes to keep 
classified.190 Specifically, there may be instances whe.re the 
Government does not wish to broadcast to a suspected terrorist th~t 
he is being targeted. For instance, there are accounts that Osama bm 
Laden first learned the Government was on his trail based on 
information the Government was required to make public during a 
terrorism trial. 191 
However the secrecy of the proceedings should be at the 
Government ,'s discretion. In cases of high profile terrorists, the 
Government may wish to make a public case, detailing legal 
justifications, thus removing the need for closed proceedings, or 
allowing a portion of the proceedings to be op.en. Furt~ermore, 
opening certain proceedings or portions of proceedmgs would mcrease 
public confidence in the hearings. 
D. Government Option for Immediacy of Proceedings 
Military necessity often requires operations be complete.cl 
extremely quickly, sometimes based on actionable intelligence. It is 
likely the Government would seek judicial approval for a tar~~ted 
killing prior to the need for such a strike, likely when s~fficient 
intelligence supports approval. However, there ma~ be ai: mstance 
when judicial approval for a drone strike is needed immediately .. In 
such circumstances national security provides an appropriate 
justification for exp,edited access to the judicial system, . including 
leapfrogging other cases on the docket and emergency hearmgs: For 
example, FISA requires that a judge be on call no .matt.er the time. of 
day, and on weekends and holidays, 192 and reqmres Judges to hve 
189. Dep't of Justice Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While Def~n?-ing 
Against Terrorism: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
107th Cong., at 11, 17, 22 (2001) (statement of William P. Barr, 
Former. Att'y Gen. of the United States); see also Guiora, supra 1.1~te 28 
at 817 (describing the trial of terror suspect Zacarias Moussaom m an 
Article III court as a "circus"). 
190. Rosen, supra note 4, at 5292-93; Murphy & Radsan, supra note 19, at 
443; George D. Brown, Accountability, Liability, a"!~ ~he Wa~ on 
Terror - Constitutional Tort Suits as Truth and Reconciliation Vehicles, 
63 FLA. L. REV. 193, 212 (2011); McNeal, supra note 186, at 29; Guiora, 
supra note 28, at 806. 
191. Michael B. Mukasey, U.S. Att'y Gen., Remarks Prepared for Delive:y at 
the Am. Enter. Inst. for Pub. Policy Research (July 21, 2008), available 
athttp://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2008/ag-speech-0807213.html. 
192. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-62, §1803(a) 
(2006). 
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within a certain distance of the courtroom. 193 A similar provision 
should also be implemented in the proposed legislation considering the 
ramifications of national security. 
E. Denial and Appeal 
. . If the Government is denied judicial approval for a targeted 
killmg, the Government is prevented from killing the suspected 
terrorist. However, a denial in no way limits other actions the 
Government seeks to take in order to combat terrorism, minimize the 
threat posed by the individual, or a variety of other security 
measures. Moreover, denial is not a bar to the Government seeking 
later ap~roval. The Government may seek judicial approval once any 
~ubst~ntial development occurs, including obtaining additional 
mte?~gence, additional action taken by the suspected terrorist, any 
sufficient development, or change in circumstance. In accordance 
with Article III, 194 the Supreme Court would have appellate 
jurisdiction to review a denial by the D.C. Circuit Court or a FISA-
type court. 195 
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION APPLIED TO ANWAR AL-AULAQI 
SCENARIO 
The applicability of the proposed proceeding can be shown by an 
application to the Al-Aulaqi scenario. Initially, the Government 
would need to prove the first element of the proposed test: that Al-
Aulaqi posed a lethal or substantial threat to the United States U.S. 
citizens in any part of the world, the U.S. military, or any 'other 
entity the Government shows is sufficient to protect. The 
Government would have had no difficulty satisfying this element 
based solely on information in the media. Evidence sufficient to meet 
the first element would have included Aulaqi's link to numerous terror 
plots like the 2009 Fort Hood Shooting Attack196 and the attempted 
2009 underwear bombing of Northwest Airlines Flight 253 191 not to 
mention other classified material. ' 
The second element the Government would have had to satisfy is 
the necessity of killing Al-Aulaqi, that is, showing that lesser actions 
193. Id. (the Act requires a minimum of three judges to reside within 20 
miles of the District of Columbia). 
194. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. 
195. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-62, §1803(b) 
(2006). (The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over FISA Court 
decisions, although a FISA Court of Review is the initial appellate 
court). 
196. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2010). 
197. Id. at 10; OFAC Designation, supra note 35. 
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Id be insufficient to protect the United States, U.S. citizens in any ;~~ of the world, the U.S. military, or any at.her entity the 
Government shows is sufficient to protect. Al-Aulaqi was placed on 
designated as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist i~ July 201?198 , 
which subjected Al-Aulaqi and AQAP to counterterror~sm s~~ct10ns 
by the Treasury Department. Yet these sanctions were msufficient to 
revent Al-Aulaqi from planning subsequent terror attacks, such as 
fhe 'Cargo Plane Bombing' attempt that occurred in October 20~0. 199 
The third element the Government would need to prove, m the 
Al-Aulaqi scenario, is that there would have been considerable 
difficulty in capturing the target. The United St~tes ~nd Yemen 
cooperate extensively on counterterrorism. e~orts, mcludmg Yemen 
allowing the U.S. military access to Yemem airspace to conduct drone 
strikes.200 Yet, despite this co?peration, Y ~men ~oes ~~t hav:e 
operational control over substantial parts of its terntory. . AntI-
government tribal clans control vast areas of the country, particularly 
in the north. These groups have professed they would have supported 
and defended Al-Aulaqi from Yemini and U.S. forces; 202 in fact, the 
Al-Awalik tribe has stated that it would "not remain with arms 
crossed if a hair of [AI-Aulaqi] is touched or if anyone plots or spies 
against him. Whoever risks denouncing [Al-Aulaqi] will be the target 
of Al-Awalik weapons."203 Moreover, the secret Obama 
Administration legal memorandum reportedly states Yemen was 
unable or unwilling to capture Al-Aulaqi. 204 Thus, it would be 
reasonable to conclude that efforts to capture Al-Aulaqi would entail 
considerable danger, akin to entry into a hostile foreign nation. 205 • 
In analyzing this element, the U.S. military raid into. Pakistan 
that killed Osama bin Laden206 is an interesting counterpomt. The 
198. OF AC Designation, supra note 35. 
199. 
200. 
Finn & Raghavan, supra note 30. 
Scott Shane U.S. Approves Targeted Killing of American Cleric, N.y. 
TIMES, Apr'. 7, 2010, at A12; Yemen, U.S. Sign Military, Security 
Cooperation Agreement, SABA YEMEN NEWS AGENCY, Nov. 10, 2009. 
201. Shane, supra note 200. 
202. Ramsden, supra note 26, at 402; Shane, supra note 200. 
203. Ramsden, supra note 26, at 402. n.100. 
204. Savage, supra note 164. 
205. One could draw rough analogies between an attempted raid
1 
by U ~· 
military into a lawless tribal land to capture Al-Aulaqi as simi ar. t? t. e 
ill-fated attempted to capture warlord Mohammed ~~rrah Aid1d m 
Somalia in 1993, which resulted in the 18 dead U.S. military personnel 
during the Battle of Mogadishu; see generally MARK BOWDEN, BLACK 
HAWK DOWN: A STORY OF MODERN WAR (1999). 
206. Scott Wilson, Craig Whitlock & William Branigin, OsaMma bi2n L2a0dleln 
Killed in U.S. Raid, Buried at S.ea, WASH. POST, ay , , 
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against him. Whoever risks denouncing [Al-Aulaqi] will be the target 
of Al-Awalik weapons."203 Moreover, the secret Obama 
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military into a lawless tribal land to capture Al-Aulaqi as simi ar. t? t. e 
ill-fated attempted to capture warlord Mohammed ~~rrah Aid1d m 
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~ounterar?ument would contend that the ability to capture bin Laden 
m sue~ circumstances· proves that similar raids are possible, makin 
the third element exceedingly difficult to satisfy. However it must b g 
acknow~edg~d .that. the bin Laden raid was an exceptio~al scenari~ an~ easily distmgmshed from most situations. First, bin Laden was a 
umque targe~ to the United States. As the recognized head leader of ~l~Qaeda, bm Laden was responsible for killing thousands of U.S 
~1tizens during the September 11 attacks in addition to involvement 
m.n~erous other terrorist plots. The risks the United States was wil~mg to accept in capturing bin Laden far exceed the danger the 
Umted States would accept in most other counterterrorism actions. 
Second, ~lt~~ugh Paki~tan claims it had no knowledge of the bin La~en raid, such claims must be viewed skeptically based on the 
Umted ~tates-Pakistan relationship in the War on Terror. Publically 
the. Pa~stani government denies it has given the United States acces~ 
to its arrspa~e to conduct drone strikes, perhaps in part to protect its 
own domestic popularity. Nevertheless, the Pakistani government 
frequently cooperates with U.S. military action. This kind of 
doubl~spea~ ma~8result from the Pakistani population's strong anti-Am~ncan views. Although based on speculation, it is possible that 
Pakistan w~s a war~ of the. bin Laden raid and took steps to facilitate 
the U.S. act10n, while maintaining ignorance for political purposes. 
F~thermore, the issue of immediacy would not have played a 
factor m .the Al-Aulaqi scenario. The Obama Administration placed ~l-Aulaq1 .on the targeted kill list in April 2010209 and he was not 
kille~. unt~l September 2011, seven months later. 210 Given the 
provrn.10n m .the proposed proceeding allowing the Government to 
~xp~d1te hearmgs, there is no conceivable reason the proceeding would 





ra1d-buned-at-sea/2011/05/02/ AFxOyAZF _story.html 
Chris Allbritton & Augustine Anthony, Pakistan Says Had No 
Knowledge of U.S. bin Laden Raid, REUTERS (May 3, 2011, 12:06 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/03/us-binladen-pakistan-
statement-idUSTRE74242R20110503. · 
Pakistani Public Opinion Ever More Critical of U.S., PEW RESEARCH 
CTR .. (Ju~e. 27, 2012), http/ /www.pewglobal.org/2012/06/27 /pakistani-
public-?p1mon-ever-more-cnt1cal-of-u-s/. (estimating favorable views of 
the Umted States amongst Pakistanis at 12 percent). 
Shane, supra note 200. 
210. Finn &, Raghavan , supra note 30. 
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V. COUNTERARGUMENTS AND REBUTTAL 
The Constitution vests the President with the responsibility to 
protect the nation from attack, 211 yet the Fifth Amendment .pro~ects 
citizens from arbitrary government action.212 When two const1tut10nal 
principles conflict, resolution is undo.ubtedly d~fficult, a difficulty 
magnified when the issue concerns nat10nal security. Thus, there are 
several plausible critiques to the proposed proceeding. 
A. Due Process v. Judicial Process 
The Obama Administration offers a unique counterargument: the 
Executive is capable of providing due process to its citizens by 
conducting an internal review. Holder, discussing targeted killings of 
citizens, recognized the Fifth Amendment's due process 
requirement.213 However, he offered a novel interpretation of what 
would satisfy the requirements of due process, stating, "[d]ue process 
and judicial process are not one and the same, particularly when it 
comes to national security. The Constitution guarantees due process, 
not judicial process. "214 Holder seemed to imply that due process is 
equally satisfied by the Executive's secret determinations that a 
citizen should be killed. 
However "Holder's defense of these assassinations depends on an 
' entirely new definition of due process"215 that no case law or statute 
supports and directly contradicts the Constitution. His reasoning 
implies that the President, under the advice of the National Security 
Council, acting as judge, jury, and executioner, satisfies the Fifth 
Amendment's due process command. Holder promoted a "dangerous 
policy that creates the illusion of external standards, the illusion of 
limitations on principled government action by establishing 
requirements ... entirely at the discretion of the Executive ... and 
that should be of extraordinary concern. "216 
In the speech, Holder offered a broad outline of the Mathews 
balC;tncing test, which guides the level of due process required under 
the Fifth Amendment. 217 Holder noted that, in order to determine 
211. U.S. CONST. art. II.; The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635, 668 (1863) 
(explaining the President's duty to defend against attack). 
212. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
213. Holder, supra note 165. 
214. Id. 
215. Julian Sanchez, Eric Holder's Dangerous Definition of Due Process, 
CATO INST. (Mar. 8, 2012), http://www.cato.org/multimedia/daily-
podcast / eric-holders-dangerous-definition-d ue-process. 
216. Id. 
217. Steve Vladeck, The Holder Speech and the Mathews Test, LAWFARE 
BLOG (Mar. 6, 2012, 1:16 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/03/ 
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equally satisfied by the Executive's secret determinations that a 
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what procedures would satisfy due process, Mathews balances the 
private interest against the government interest and the burdens the 
government would endure in providing that additional process.218 
However, Holder omitted an integral part of the Mathews test: "the 
risk of an erroneous deprivation of the liberty interest through the 
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards. "219 This omission is greatly 
magnified, as earlier argued, when the deprivation is the taking of a 
"t" ' Ii£ 220F h c1 izen s e. urt ermore, Holder argued this power is granted to 
the Executive via the AUMF.221 But this argument assumes that 
Congress, in enacting the A UMF, intended to give the Executive the 
power to kill citizens without due process. While such a proposition 
may be subject to harsh public debate, it is legally moot, as Congress 
has no power to override the Fifth Amendment via· ordinary 
legislation. The Fifth Amendment guarantees "force cannot be used 
against citizens, on a pre-targeted, individualized basis, without the 
factual predicates for the action being put to the test in an 
in~ependent, judicial forum. "222 Under Holder's reasoning, a drone 
stnke on a citizen is entails such a use of force on a pre-targeted 
individualized basis that the Fifth Amendment prohibits without 
judicial review. 
B. Political Question 
The obvious counterargument to the proposed due process 
procedure is that drone strikes against terrorists are simply political 
questions lying solely in the realm of the Executive. If this is the 
case, "[i]t is well established that federal courts will not adjudicate 
political questions. "223 For example, in Baker v. Carr, the Supreme 
Court noted that political questions are not justiciable primarily 
because of the separation of powers within the Federal Government.224 
Courts will find a non-justiciable political question when "a textually 
the-holder-speech-and-the-mathews-test /. 
218. Holder, supra note 165. 
219. Vladeck, supra note 217. 
220. See supra Part II (A). 
221. Holder, supra note 165. 
222. Robert Chesney, Holder on Targeted Strikes: The Key Passages with 
Commentary, LAWFARE Blog (Mar. 5, 2012, 5:05 PM), 
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/03/holder-on-targeted-strikes-the-
key-passages-with-commentary /. 
223. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518 (1969). 
224. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962). 
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demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate 
l"t" 1 d t t "225 po I ica epar men . . . . . 
Those believing the political question doctrme bars Judicial 
inquiry into· drone strikes argue the Executive must m~ke pror:ipt 
decisions regarding national security based on the mformat10n, 
expertise, and experience that only it possesses.226 In fact~ the 
Supreme Court has been reluctant "to intrude upon the authonty o~ 
the Executive in military and national security affairs. "227 In H amdi 
v. Rumsfeld, the Government contended that "a system of trial-like 
process" would require discovery into military operations that w~uld 
"intrude on the sensitive secrets of national defense and result m a 
futile search for evidence buried under the rubble of war. "228 The 
Executive branch suggests that a targeted drone strike on a citizen is 
a non-justiciable political question because foreign policy and military 
affairs "involve discretion the exercise of discretion demonstrably 
committed to the executive or legislature. "229 The District Court in 
Al-Aulaqi v. Obama supported this conclusion when it found that the 
courts should be excluded from exercising oversight of the Executive 
in this realm, stating "there are no judicially manageable standards 
by which courts can endeavor to assess the President's interpretation 
of military intelligence and his resulting decision . . . whether to use 
military force against a terrorist. "230 
As earlier addressed, the Government argues that when vetting 
potential targets of drone strikes, internal Executive branch 
judgments satisfy due process.231 Although "[c]ourts should accord the 
utmost deference to executive assertions of privilege upon grounds of 
military or diplomatic secrets,"232 "[not] every case or controversy 




Holder, supra note 165; Chesney, supra note 222 ("[T]he executive 
branch has superior access to relevant information and expertise (and 
capacity to make quick decisions) with respect to targeting decisions, 
and comparative institutional legitimacy grounds to the effect that such 
decisions are a core function of the executive branch."). 
Dep't. of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988); Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 587 (1952) (admitting "broad 
powers in military commanders engaged in day-to-day fighting in a 
theater of war."). 
542 U.S. 507, 532 (2004) (plurality opinion); Id. at. 579 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (arguing for a broad interpretation of Executive branch 
discretion in the War on Terror, especially emphasizing the judiciary's 
lack of proficiency). 
229. Al-Aulaqi Response, supra note 37, at 20 (citing Baker, 369 U.S. at 
211). 
230. 727 F. Supp. 2d, 46-47 (D.D.C. 2010). 
231. Holder, supra note 165. 
232. Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
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power to kill citizens without due process. While such a proposition 
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against citizens, on a pre-targeted, individualized basis, without the 
factual predicates for the action being put to the test in an 
independent, judicial forum. "222 Under Holder's reasoning, a drone 
strike on a citizen is entails such a use of force on a pre-targeted, 
individualized basis that the Fifth Amendment prohibits without 
judicial review. 
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Courts will find a non-justiciable political question when "a textually 
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219. Vladeck, supra note 217. 
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demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate 
l·t· 1 d t t n22s po i ica epar men . . . . . 
Those believing the political question doctrme bars Judicial 
inquiry into· drone strikes argue the Executive must m~ke proi:ipt 
decisions regarding national security based on the mformat10n, 
expertise, and experience that only it possesses.226 In fact, the 
Supreme Court has been reluctant "to intrude upon the authority o~ 
the Executive in military and national security affairs. "227 In Hamdi 
v. Rumsfeld, the Government contended that "a system of trial-like 
process" would require discovery into military operations that w?uld 
"intrude on the sensitive secrets of national defense and result m a 
futile search for evidence buried under the rubble of war. "228 The 
Executive branch suggests that a targeted drone strike on a citizen is 
a non-justiciable political question because foreign policy and military 
affairs "involve discretion the exercise of discretion demonstrably 
committed to the executive or legislature. "229 The District Court in 
Al-Aulaqi v. Obama supported this conclusion when it found that the 
courts should be excluded from exercising oversight of the Executive 
in this realm, stating "there are no judicially manageable standards 
by which courts can endeavor to assess the President's interpretation 
of military intelligence and his resulting decision ... whether to use 
military force against a terrorist. "230 
As earlier addressed, the Government argues that when vetting 
potential targets of drone strikes, internal Executive branch 
judgments satisfy due process.231 Although "[c]ourts should accord the 
utmost deference to executive assertions of privilege upon grounds of 
military or diplomatic secrets,"232 "[not] every case or controversy 
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542 U.S. 507, 532 (2004) (plurality opinion); Id. at 579 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (arguing for a broad inte~pretation o~ _Executi~e ?~anc~ 
discretion in the War on Terror, especially emphas1zmg the Judiciary s 
lack of proficiency). 
229. Al-Aulaqi Response, supra note 37, at 20 (citing Baker, 369 U.S. at 
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230. 727 F. Supp. 2d, 46-47 (D.D.C. 2010). 
231. Holder, supra note 165. 
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which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance. "233 
Courts must perform "a discriminating analysis of the particular 
question posed . . . in the specific case. "234 Here, the Executive 
contends that it can provide the due process that the Fifth 
Amendment requires with respect to citizens engaged in terrorism 
abroad. However, the adequacy of the proposed due process is a 
matter of constitutional interpretation that must be decided by the 
courts. "[W]hether a matter· has in any measure been committed by 
the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the 
action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been 
committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation 
and is a responsibility of [the judiciary]. "235 The courts must 
determine "what power the Constitution confers upon the [Executive] 
through [the Fifth Amendment] before [the courts] can determine to 
what extent, if any, the exercise of that power is subject to judicial 
review. "
236 
Thus, the issue is not barred by the political doctrine 
question and is justiciable. 
C. State Secrets Doctrine 
In United States v. Reynolds, the Supreme Court recognized the 
State Secrets Privilege,237 "a Government privilege against court 
ordered disclosure of state and military secrets. "238 The privilege is 
founded on the idea that "in exceptional circumstances, courts must 
act in the interest of the country's national security to prevent 
disclosure of state secrets. "239 The· Government may prevent the 
disclosure in a judicial proceeding if '"there is a reasonable danger" 
that such disclosure will expose military matters which, in the interest 
of national security, should not be divulged. "240 The doctrine includes 
a wide range of information that could reasonably result in 
"impairment of the nation's defense capabilities, disclosure of 
233. Baker, 369 U.S. at 211. 
234. El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. v. United States., 607 F.3d 836, 841 (D.C. Cir. 
2010) (citing Baker, 369 U.S. at 211). 
235. Baker, 369 U.S. at 211; Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 519 (1969). 
("In order to determine whether there has been a textual commitment ~o a coordinate department of the Government, [the judiciary] must 
mterpret the Constitution."). 
236. Powell, 395 U.S. at 519. 
237. Reynolds, '345 U.S. 1, 5 (1953). 
238. Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 131 S.Ct. 1900, 1905 (2011). 
239. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1077 (9th Cir. 
2010) (en bane). 
240. El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 302 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing 
Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10). 
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intelligence-gathering methods or capabilities, and disruption of 
. "th £ . t ll241 diplomatic relat10ns WI oreign governmen s .. 
Those suggesting the state secrets doctrme b~rs the propos~d 
judicial proceedings argue that the proposed proceedmg would re~mre 
the revelation of state secrets that would be detrimental to nati?~al 
security.242 Specifically, the argument sugges~s. that. s~i:sitive 
· £ormation would be revealed, including the identities of mdividuals 
m l · "th targeted for killings, military tactics and strategy, and re ations wi 
foreign states.243 . . • 
Although the District Court in Al-Aulaqi v. Obam_a d~d not decide 
on the case on the state secrets issue (the case was dismissed for lack 
of standing), the Court did acknowledge that the. evidence of the ~ase 
may very well constitute state secrets.244 I_n a typical legal proceedmg, 
the state secrets privilege may be an msurmountable bar to ~he 
introduction of such evidence. However, the proposed legal proceedmg 
accounts for these concerns in a manner analogous to FISA Court 
proceedings, where the Government has the _option to implement 
secrecy into the hearing245 and all persons mvolved would have 
security clearances.246 As a result, the proposed ~rocee~i~g allows for 
the protection of classified information while abidmg by the 
Constitution's mandate of due process before deprivation of life.247 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Many non-legal arguments have been made that drone st~ikes are 
a beneficial tool, and that killing Al-Aulaqi was prudent give?-. the 
danger he posed to the United States. ~ev~r~heless, ~argeted killmgs 
without any legal justification or Judicial review present a 
considerable risk of error and abuse, 248 not to mention unfettered 
Executive discretion. After all, "[l]egal authority is what 





Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
Rosen, supra note 4, at 5292; Murphy & Radsan, supra note 18, at 443; 
Brown, supra note 190, at 212. 
McNeal, supra note 186, at 29 (noting what he calls the "non-
prosecution paradox" suggests the failure of the c~rren~ system to. try 
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which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance. "233 
Courts must perform "a discriminating analysis of the particular 
question posed . . . in the specific case. "234 Here, the Executive 
contends that it can provide the due process that the Fifth 
Amendment requires with respect to citizens engaged in terrorism 
abroad. However, the adequacy of the proposed due process is a 
matter of constitutional interpretation that must be decided by the 
courts. "[W]hether a matter has in any measure been committed by 
the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the 
action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been 
committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation 
and is a responsibility of [the judiciary]. "235 The courts must 
determine "what power the Constitution confers upon the [Executive] 
through [the Fifth Amendment] before [the courts] can determine to 
what extent, if any, the exercise of that power is subject to judicial 
review. "236 Thus, the issue is not barred by the political doctrine 
question and is justiciable. 
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State Secrets Privilege,237 "a Government privilege against court 
ordered disclosure of state and military secrets. "238 The privilege is 
founded on the idea that "in exceptional circumstances, courts must 
act in the interest of the country's national security to prevent 
disclosure of state secrets. "239 The· Government may prevent the 
disclosure in a judicial proceeding if '"there is a reasonable danger" 
that such disclosure will expose military matters which, in the interest 
of national security, should not be divulged. "240 The doctrine includes 
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introduction of such evidence. However, the proposed legal proceedmg 
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person controlling the drone, the attack may seem more like to a 
video game than reality. Thousands of miles can separate the prey 
from the predator, making it all too easy to forget that the 
consequences are real. Yet, a drone strike on a citizen implicates the 
fundamental constitutional principles of due process and arbitrary 
government action, not to mention the resulting death of the citizen. 
These serious issues necessitate judicial review. 
Some will claim that the proposed solution is nothing more than a 
fig leaf of procedural safeguards; that courts, just as in Al-Aulaqi v. 
Obama, will defer to the Executive in the name of national security. 
Others will claim that the proposed solution is a judicial intrusion 
onto the Executive's realm of foreign policy and military affairs, 
resulting in a diminution of national security. However, the ends 
never justify the means. In the past, the United States has set aside 
the Constitution in the name of security. The results of those 
instances have been stains on the country's legacy, such as the 
internment of thousands of Japanese Americans250 and the Alien and 
Sedition Acts. 251 We must not forsake seminal constitutional principles 
due to fear. If the Executive can kill a citizen without judicial review 
because it has determined the citizen is a terrorist and the means to 
arrest the citizen are not reasonable, what is the boundary of such 
power and in what other situations could that power be utilized? The 
scope of that authority and its consequences will become "too 
extravagant to be maintained. "252 
Targeted killing without due process is more akin to policy that 
terrorists would evoke than a democracy. In this struggle, the United 
States must hold itself to a ·higher standard. The strength of a 
democratic state is its legitimacy,253 which must be maintained even 
at dear costs. As Justice O'Connor eloquently pronounced in Hamdi 
v. Rumsfeld, "[i]t is during our most challenging and uncertain 
moments that our Nation's commitment to due process is most 
severely tested; and it is in those times that we must preserve our 
commitment at home to the principles for which we fight abroad. "254 
250. See Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989 (1988) 
(acknowledging and apologizing for the fundamental injustice of the 
internment of U.S. citizens and permanent resident aliens of Japanese 
ancestry during World War II and providing reparations). 
251. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964) {"Although 
the Sedition Act :was never tested in this Court, the attack upon its 
validity has carried the day in the court of history."); Watts v. United 
States 394 U.S. 705, 710 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("The Alien 
and Sedition Laws constituted one of our sorriest chapters."). 
252. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 179 (1803). 
253. Lunday & Rishikof, supra note 158, at 89. 
254. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 532. 
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